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developing	 countries	 to	 rich	 countries,	 and	 public	 discussion	 on	migration	 in	many	 rich	
countries	is	centered	around	issues	related	to	immigration.		Less	attention	has	been	paid	to	
the	 fact	 that	migration	 from	 rich	 countries	 takes	 place	 as	 well.	 According	 to	 the	 United	
Nations	 (2013),	 21.9	million	persons	 from	EU15	 countries	 lived	outside	 their	 birthplace,	
with	 42	 percent	 of	 these	 migrants	 living	 in	 other	 EU15	 countries	 and	 an	 additional	 13	
percent	living	in	the	United	States.		The	essays	in	this	dissertation	aim	to	shed	light	on	some	
central	 questions	 concerning	migration	 in	 and	 from	European	 countries.	 Since	 economic	
returns	to	individual	skills	are	relatively	low	in	many	European	welfare	states,	it	is	of	policy	





the	 sending	 countries	 is	 a	 central	 result	 in	 economics	 of	 migration,	 and	 beginning	 with	
Borjas	 (1987),	 there	has	been	a	great	deal	 of	 interest	 in	deriving	and	empirically	 testing	
models	that	predict	how	migrants	differ	from	non‐migrants.	The	question	is	of	relevance,	
since	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 non‐random	 selection	 of	 migrants	 affects	 the	 level	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 welfare	 in	 both	 sending	 and	 receiving	 countries.	 However,	 most	 of	 the	
contemporary	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 concerns	migration	 from	




empirical	 knowledge	 of	 selection	 of	migrants	 from	 a	 rich	 European	 country	 the	 chapter	
also	introduces	a	novel	theoretical	contribution	as	it	is	shown	that	the	Roy	model	has	more	
precise	predictions	about	the	self‐selection	of	migrants	than	has	been	previously	realized.	
The	 same	 conditions	 that	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 result	 in	 positive	 or	 negative	 selection	 in	
terms	 of	 expected	 earnings	 also	 imply	 a	 stochastic	 dominance	 relationship	 between	 the	
earnings	or	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	Using	Danish	full‐population	
register	data	we	are	able	 find	strong	support	 for	 the	theoretical	considerations;	migrants	
from	 Denmark	 are	 positively	 selected	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 age‐year	 standardized	 pre‐
emigration	earnings	and	in	terms	of	wage	regression	residuals	that	serve	as	a	measure	of	




study	 what	 determines	 their	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 of	 income	 in	 Denmark.	 The	
question	is	relevant	because,	as	the	results	in	chapter	one	reveal,	migrants	from	Denmark	





the	chapter	 is	 that	migrants	who	 live	 in	destinations	outside	Nordic	countries,	where	the	
societies	 are	 relatively	 similar	 to	Denmark	 in	 terms	of	 taxation	and	 returns	 to	 skills,	 are	
more	opposed	to	a	suggestion	of	increasing	redistribution	of	income	in	Denmark.		Further,	
those	who	migrated	for	work‐related	reasons	are	more	opposed	to	the	suggestion.	We	are	
not	 able	 to	 show	 whether	 those	 who	 dislike	 high	 taxes	 in	 Denmark	 self‐select	 to	 non‐




trait	 that	migrants	bring	with	 them	from	their	countries	of	origin,	or	whether	 it	 tends	 to	
change	rapidly.	The	main	 finding	 is	 that	unlike	more	general	 trust	 towards	other	people,	
trust	towards	institutions	seems	to	change	when	an	individual	migrates	from	one	country	
to	 the	other.	Trust	 towards	 institutions	 is	widely	considered	to	be	an	essential	 feature	of	
European	welfare	states.	According	to	the	findings	it	is	possible	for	a	culture	where	public	
















Chapter 1.  
Self-Selection of Emigrants: Theory and Evidence on Stochastic Dominance in 













value	of	 the	 tax	payments	of	 immigrants	 exceeds	 the	net	present	 value	of	 the	 costs	 they	
impose.	 Both	 the	 immigration	 of	 net	 recipients	 and	 the	 emigration	 of	 net	 payers	 pose	 a	
challenge	to	the	public	treasury	(Wildasin	1991;	Sinn	1997).		
	
Beginning	 with	 Borjas	 (1987),	 there	 has	 been	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 interest	 in	 deriving	 and	
empirically	 testing	models	 that	 predict	 how	migrants	 differ	 from	non‐migrants.	Many	 of	
these	studies	rely	on	an	application	of	the	Roy	model	of	occupational	self‐selection.	As	long	
as	 skills	 are	 sufficiently	 transferable	 across	 countries,	 the	 sorting	 of	 persons	 across	
countries	is	mainly	determined	by	international	differences	in	the	rate	of	return	to	skills.	A	
country	 like	 the	 United	 States	 would	 then	 attract	 high‐skilled	 workers	 from	 more	
egalitarian	countries	(i.e.,	countries	offering	relatively	low	rates	of	return	to	skills)	and	low‐
skilled	workers	 from	 countries	with	 greater	 income	 inequality	 than	 in	 the	United	 States	



















most	 redistributive	European	welfare	 states.	 In	2013,	over	 a	quarter	million	Danes	 lived	
outside	Denmark	(corresponding	to	about	5	percent	of	the	Danish‐born	population),	with	
50	 percent	 of	 the	migrants	 living	 in	 other	 EU15	 countries	 and	 13	 percent	 in	 the	 United	
States	 (United	 Nations,	 Department	 of	 Economic	 and	 Social	 Affairs	 2013).	 Because	 the	
returns	to	skills	 in	Denmark	are	relatively	low,	the	canonical	Roy	model	predicts	that	the	
emigrants	 should	 be	 positively	 selected	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 expected	 earnings	 of	 the	
migrants	exceed	the	expected	earnings	of	the	stayers.4	However,	there	have	not	been	any	
prior	 studies	 that	 examine	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 from	 a	 relatively	 egalitarian	
country	to	see	whether	this	is	indeed	the	case.	
	




in	 the	 literature,	but	also	about	 the	stochastic	ordering	of	 the	 two	earnings	distributions.	
We	show	that	the	same	conditions	that	predict	that	migrants	are	positively	self‐selected	in	
the	sense	of	a	difference	 in	expected	incomes	also	predict	that	the	 income	distribution	of	
the	migrants	will	 first‐order	 stochastically	 dominate	 the	 income	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐
migrants.	
	
Our	 empirical	 analysis	 uses	 the	 Danish	 full	 population	 register	 data	 to	 analyze	 how	
migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 differ	 in	 their	 pre‐emigration	 earnings	 and	 other	 observable	
characteristics.	 To	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 role	 of	 unobservable	 characteristics	 in	 the	 selection	




Following	 our	 reframing	 of	 the	 canonical	 Roy	 framework	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
stochastic	dominance,	our	study	specifically	tests	for	whether	the	earnings	distribution	of	

















merged	 information	 from	 the	U.S.	 census	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	Mexican	migrants	
with	 information	 from	 the	 Mexican	 census	 on	 the	 characteristics	 of	 the	 Mexican	 non‐
migrants.	 Because	 the	merged	 data	 did	 not	 report	 the	 earnings	 of	migrants	prior	 to	 the	
move,	 pre‐migration	 earnings	were	 predicted	 based	 on	 observable	 characteristics	 of	 the	
migrants.	This	“counterfactual”	empirical	exercise	suggested	that	Mexican	emigrants	were	
located	 in	 the	 medium‐high	 range	 of	 the	 Mexican	 wage	 distribution.	 The	 finding	 of	
intermediate	 selection	 in	 the	 Mexican	 context	 does	 not	 seem	 consistent	 with	 the	 basic	
implications	of	 the	Roy	model	 because	 the	 rate	of	 return	 to	 skills	 is	 far	 larger	 in	Mexico	
than	 in	 the	United	States.	More	recent	 studies	by	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	 (2011)	and	
Kaestner	 and	 Malamud	 (2014)	 use	 survey	 data	 that	 report	 the	 actual	 pre‐migration	
earnings	 and	 find	 evidence	 of	 negative	 selection.	 They	 also	 conclude	 that	 part	 of	 the	
negative	 selection	 can	 be	 traced	 to	 the	 unobservable	 characteristics	 that	 determine	 a	
migrant’s	earnings.		
	
The	 important	 role	 played	 by	 unobservable	 characteristics	 implies	 that	 constructing	 a	
counterfactual	earnings	distribution	 for	 the	migrants	based	on	observable	characteristics	
can	greatly	bias	the	nature	of	the	selection	revealed	by	the	data.	Our	findings	suggest	that	
the	use	of	 such	a	 counterfactual	distribution	will	 tend	 to	understate	 the	 true	 selection	 in	
earnings,	so	that	the	selection	implied	by	the	counterfactual	distribution	is	far	weaker	than	
the	 true	 selection—regardless	 of	 whether	 there	 is	 positive	 or	 negative	 selection.	 The	
numerical	bias	that	results	from	using	the	counterfactual	estimation	is	sizable	in	the	Danish	




analysis	 and	 derives	 theoretical	 predictions	 concerning	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 emigrants,	
using	 the	notion	of	 stochastic	dominance	as	a	unifying	concept.	Section	3	 introduces	and	
describes	 the	 unique	 population	 data	 that	we	 use	 and	 reports	 some	 summary	 statistics.	
Sections	4	and	5	present	the	main	empirical	findings.	In	section	4,	we	examine	the	selection	
in	 terms	of	 observed	pre‐migration	earnings.	We	present	 a	 statistical	method	 for	 testing	
the	 theoretical	 implication	 that	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 of	 the	 emigrants	 should	
stochastically	 dominate	 the	 corresponding	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐migrants.	 Section	 5	
extends	 the	 empirical	 work	 by	 examining	 the	 selection	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 unobserved	












Previous	 literature	 on	 the	 self‐selection	 of	 migrants	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 conditional	
expectations	 of	 earnings	 distributions	 among	 migrants	 and	 stayers.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	
derive	 a	 novel	 result:	 the	 Roy	model	 implies	 that	 under	 certain	 conditions,	 the	 earnings	
distribution	of	migrants	first‐order	stochastically	dominates,	or	is	stochastically	dominated	
by,	the	earnings	distribution	of	stayers.	In	a	bivariate	normal	framework,	it	turns	out	that	
the	 conditions	 required	 for	 stochastic	 dominance	 are	 identical	 to	 the	 conditions	 that	
determine	the	nature	of	self‐selection	in	terms	of	expected	earnings.	
	





the	 data,	 while	 the	 component	 of	 earnings	 that	 is	 left	 unexplained	 by	 the	 data	 is	 the	
unobservable	 skill	 component.	 Even	 though	 the	 content	 of	 the	 two	 components	 differs	








on	 a	 single	 observed	 skill	 characteristic	 s	 and	 suppress	 the	 subscript	 that	 indexes	 a	
particular	 individual.	 For	 concreteness,	 the	 variable	 s	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 giving	 the	




(1.1)	 	 logݓ଴ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅ ݎ଴ݏ ൅ ߝ଴ᇱ	 		
 
where	w0	 gives	 the	wage	 in	 the	 source	 country;	r0	gives	 the	 rate	of	 return	 to	observable	
skills;	 and	 the	 random	 variable	 0	 measures	 individual‐specific	 productivity	 shocks	
resulting	from	unobserved	characteristics	and	is	normally	distributed	with	mean	zero	and	
variance	 .	 The	 distribution	 of	 observable	 skills	 in	 the	 source	 country’s	 population	 is	














For	 analytical	 convenience,	 we	 assume	 that	 Cov(0,	 s)	 =	 Cov(1,	 s)	 =	 0,	 so	 that	 the	
individual‐specific	unobserved	productivity	shocks	(i.e.,	the	“residuals”	from	the	regression	
line)	are	independent	from	observable	characteristics.5	The	correlation	coefficient	between	









(1.3)	 	 ܫ ൌ log ቀ ௪భ௪బା஼ቁ ൎ ሾሺߙଵ െ ߙ଴ሻ ൅ ሺݎଵ െ ݎ଴ሻߤ௦ െ ߨሿ ൅ ሾሺݎଵߝ௦ ൅ ߝଵሻ െ ሺݎ଴ߝ௦ ൅ ߝ଴ሻሿ	
																														ൌ ∆ߤ ൅ ሺݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ,	
	 	
where		gives	a	“time‐equivalent”	measure	of	migration	costs	(	=	C/w0).	The	cross‐country	
difference	 in	 earnings	 net	 of	 the	 time‐equivalent	 migration	 cost	 for	 an	 individual	 with	
average	observed	and	unobserved	characteristics	is	given	by		






























Roy	 model	 lets	 us	 examine	which	 persons	 find	 it	 most	 worthwhile	 to	 leave	 the	 source	





Let	 FM(z)	 and	 FN(z)	 represent	 the	 (cumulative)	 probability	 distributions	 of	 skills	 or	
earnings	 for	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 in	 the	 source	 country,	 respectively,	 where	 z	
denotes	a	particular	measure	of	skills	(e.g.,	observable	or	unobservable	characteristics	or	
income).	 By	 definition,	 the	 probability	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 FM(z)	 first‐order	
stochastically	dominates	that	of	stayers	FN(z)	if:9	
	
(1.5)	 	 ࡲࡹሺݖሻ ൑ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ∀	ݖ,		

























If	 the	 skill	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants,	 the	
stochastic	 dominance	 then	 also	 implies	 the	 typical	 definition	 of	 positive	 selection	 that	 is	
based	on	conditional	expectations:	
	
(1.6)	 	 ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൐ 0ሻ ൐ ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൑ 0ሻ,	
	
so	 that	migrants,	on	average,	are	more	skilled	 than	stayers.	Conversely,	 if	 the	probability	
distribution	 of	 stayers	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	migrants,	 and	 there	was	 negative	
selection,	it	would	also	follow	that	ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൐ 0ሻ ൏ ܧሺݖ|ܫ ൑ 0ሻ.	The	converse,	however,	is	not	
true	for	a	general	distribution:	A	claim	of	positive	selection	in	expectations,	as	defined	by	




f(x,	v)	 be	 a	bivariate	normal	density	 function,	with	means	 (x,	v),	 variances	 2 2( , )x v  	and	
correlation	 coefficient	 .	 Further,	 let	 the	 random	 variable	 v	 be	 truncated	 from	 below	 at	
point	a	 and	 from	 above	 at	 point	b.	 Arnold	 et	 al.	 (1993,	 p.473)	 show	 that	 the	 (marginal)	
moment	 generating	 function	 of	 the	 standardized	 random	 variable	 (x	 ‐	x)/x,	 given	 the	
truncation	of	v,	is	given	by:	
	
































(1.10)	 	 ݉ிሺെݐሻ ൏ 	݉ீሺെݐሻ, ∀	ݐ ൐ 0,		
where	mF	 is	 the	 moment	 generating	 function	 associated	 with	 distribution	 F;	mG	 is	 the	
moment	generating	function	associated	with	G.	
	
The	 ranking	 of	 the	 moment	 generating	 functions	 in	 equation	 (1.10)	 implies	 we	 can	
determine	the	stochastic	ranking	of	the	two	distributions	by	simply	solving	for	the	relevant	
correlation	 coefficient	 ,	 and	 comparing	 equations	 (1.8)	 and	 (1.9).	 Such	 a	 comparison	
implies	that:	
	
(1.11)	 	 ࡲࡹ	ሺݖሻ ൏ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ,							݂݅								ߩ ൐ 0		 	 ࡲࡹ	ሺݖሻ ൐ ࡲࡺሺݖሻ,							݂݅								ߩ ൏ 0.		
	
In	 other	 words,	 migrants	 are	 positively	 selected	 if	 	 >	 0,	 and	 are	 negatively	 selected	
otherwise.	 Consider	 initially	 the	 stochastic	 ranking	 in	 observable	 characteristics.	 The	
random	variable	x	=	s,	and	the	relevant	correlation	coefficient		is	defined	by:	
	





of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 depends	 only	 on	 international	 differences	 in	 the	 rate	 of	
return	 to	observable	skills.	The	skill	distribution	of	migrants	will	 stochastically	dominate	
that	 of	 stayers	 when	 the	 rate	 of	 return	 to	 skills	 is	 higher	 abroad.	 Conversely,	 the	 skill	



















unobserved	 skills,	 the	 larger	 the	 residual	 inequality	 in	 wages.10	As	 long	 as	 unobserved	






(1.14)	 	 log	ݓ0	 ൌ 	 ሺα0	 ൅ 	ݎ0	μsሻ 	൅	ሺݎ0	εݏ	 ൅ 	ε0ሻ 	ൌ 	 ሺα0	 ൅ 	ݎ0	μݏሻ 	൅ 	ݒ0,	
	




(1.15)	 	 ߩ ൌ ܥ݋ݎݎሺݒ଴, ݒଵ െ ݒ଴ሻ ൌ ఙೡబఙೡ ቂߛ ቀ
௥భ
௥బ െ 1ቁ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቀߩ଴ଵ
ఙభ
ఙబ െ 1ቁቃ,		
where	ߛ ൌ ݎ଴ଶߪ௦ଶ ߪ௩଴ଶ⁄ 	and	1 െ ߛ ൌ ߪ଴ଶ ߪ௩଴ଶ⁄ .		
The	sign	of	the	correlation	in	equation	(1.15),	which	determines	the	nature	of	the	selection	
in	pre‐migration	earnings,	depends	on	the	sign	of	a	weighted	average	of	the	selection	that	





positive	 (negative)	 selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings.	 If,	 however,	 there	 are	 different	
types	of	 selection	 in	 the	 two	 types	of	 skills,	 the	 selection	 in	 each	 type	 is	weighted	by	 its	
importance	 in	 creating	 the	 variance	 of	 the	 earnings	 distribution.	 It	 is	 well	 known	 that	
observable	 characteristics	 (such	 as	 educational	 attainment)	 explain	 a	 relatively	 small	
fraction	of	the	variance	in	earnings	(perhaps	less	than	a	third).	As	a	result,	equation	(1.15)	
implies	that	it	is	the	selection	in	unobservables	that	is	most	likely	to	determine	the	nature	of	







important	 role	 in	 explaining	 why	 the	 evidence	 reported	 in	 Fernández‐Huertas	 Moraga	











௥బ െ 1ቁ ߣሺെΔߤ
∗ሻ ൅ ఙబమఙೡ ቀߩ଴ଵ
ఙభ




where	*)	=	(*)/[1		(*)]	>	0,	 and		is	 the	density	of	 the	standard	normal	
distribution.	As	can	be	seen	by	examining	equation	 (1.16),	 the	 conditions	 that	determine	
the	 quality	 of	 self‐selection	 in	 terms	 of	 expectations	 are	 the	 same	 as	 the	 conditions	 that	
determine	the	stochastic	ordering	of	the	skill	distributions	of	migrants	and	non‐migrants.	
In	 the	normal	distribution	 framework	 that	underlies	 the	 canonical	Roy	model,	 stochastic	
dominance	implies	selection	in	expectations,	and	vice	versa.	
	
In	empirical	 applications,	however,	 the	prediction	of	 stochastic	dominance	 is	 likely	 to	be	
much	 less	 robust	 than	 the	predictions	 concerning	expectations	and	 testing	 for	 stochastic	
dominance	will	require	a	more	rigorous	test	than	simply	comparing	the	average	incomes	or	
skills	 of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants.	 If	 one	 just	 compares	 the	 averages	 to	 find	 out	 how	
migrants	are	self‐selected,	the	findings	can	be	compatible	with	the	predictions	of	the	Roy‐
model	 even	 if	 a	 large	 number	 of	 individuals	 in	 the	 data	 behave	 against	 the	 stochastic	
dominance	 predictions	 of	 the	 model.	 As	 a	 result,	 establishing	 an	 empirical	 pattern	 of	






Our	analysis	uses	 register	data	 for	 the	entire	Danish	population	 from	1995	 to	2001.	The	
data	 is	 maintained	 and	 provided	 by	 Statistics	 Denmark	 and	 it	 derives	 from	 the	












worked	 full	 time.13	Migration	 decisions	 of	 part‐time	 workers	 or	 of	 workers	 outside	 the	
labor	force	may	be	driven	by	different	factors,	and	the	observed	income	of	these	workers	
may	not	be	indicative	of	their	true	earnings	potential.	The	income	variable	for	each	year	is	
constructed	 by	 adding	 the	 worker’s	 annual	 gross	 labor	 income	 and	 positive	 values	 of	
freelance	income.14		
	
We	 merged	 this	 information	 with	 data	 from	 the	 migration	 register	 for	 the	 years	 1995	
through	 2006.	 The	migration	 register	 reports	 the	 date	 of	 emigration	 and	 the	 country	 of	
destination.	Even	though	it	is	possible	for	Danish	citizens	to	emigrate	without	registering,	
we	expect	 that	 the	numbers	of	persons	who	do	so	 is	 small	as	 it	 is	mandatory	 for	Danish	




she	 emigrated	 from	 Denmark	 during	 the	 following	 calendar	 year.	 If	 we	 found	 that	 a	
particular	 person	 emigrated,	 we	 searched	 for	 the	 person	 in	 the	 migration	 register	 for	






To	 focus	on	migration	decisions	 that	are	permanent	 in	nature,	we	restrict	 the	analysis	 to	
migration	spells	that	are	at	least	five	years	long.15	We	define	a	migrant	as	an	individual	who	
is	found	in	one	of	the	1995‐2004	cross‐sections,	who	emigrates	from	Denmark	during	the	
following	 year	 to	 destinations	 outside	 Greenland	 or	 the	 Faroe	 Islands,	 and	 who	 stays	


























Table	 1.1	 reports	 summary	 statistics	 from	 the	 Danish	 register	 data.	 The	 panel	 data	 set	
contains	over	6.4	million	male	and	5.1	million	female	non‐migrants.	The	construction	of	the	
data	implies	that	non‐migrants	appear	in	the	data	multiple	times	(potentially	once	in	each	
cross‐section	 between	 1995	 and	 2004).	 We	 were	 able	 to	 identify	 7323	 male	 and	 3436	
female	migrants.	By	construction,	these	migrants	are	persons	who	we	first	observe	residing	
in	Denmark	and	who	left	the	country	at	some	point	between	1996	and	2005.	As	Table	1.1	











Table	 1.2	 reports	 the	 number	 of	 emigrants	moving	 to	 different	 destinations.	 The	 largest	
destinations	for	both	men	and	women	are	two	other	Nordic	countries,	Sweden	and	Norway,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 and	 Germany.20	These	 five	 countries	
account	for	57	percent	of	all	emigration.	
	
Finally,	 it	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 summarize	 the	 link	 between	 education	 and	 emigration.	
Table	1.3	reports	the	education	distributions	for	non‐migrants	and	migrants.	It	 is	evident	
that	the	migrants	tend	to	be	more	educated	than	the	non‐migrants,	among	both	men	and	
women.	 For	 example,	 50	 percent	 of	 Danish	 (male)	 non‐migrants	 have	 a	 vocational	
education,	 as	 compared	 to	 only	 30	 percent	 of	 emigrants	 to	 non‐Nordic	 destinations.	
Similarly, the fraction of male migrants to non-Nordic destinations with a Master’s degree is 24 
















In order to add time dimension, we compute the difference between the average of the log 
standardized earnings, or a degree of selection, for migrants and non-migrants for each year from 
1995 to 2004 for men and women separately. The results are reported in figures 1.1a and 1.1b. 
There is a downward trend in the difference for both men and women. The finding makes sense: 
when the migrants are positively self-selected and the emigration rate gets bigger the average 
standardized earnings of migrants should get smaller. The variation across years is however 
small, so pooling the data is justified. The evolution of the emigration rate is presented in figure 
1.2a for men and in figure 1.2b for women separately for the whole population and for those with 
higher education and those without higher education. As we are looking at long-term migration, 
the emigration rates are small, but there is an upward trend. The rate is higher for men and for 
those with higher education. 
 












among	 emigrants	 because	 their	 standardized	 earnings	 exceeded	 those	 of	 non‐migrants.	
However,	 differences	 in	 conditional	 averages	 could	 be	 masking	 substantial	 differences	
between	the	underlying	probability	distributions.	Our	theoretical	framework	predicts	that	




require	 any	 type	 of	 kernel	 density	 estimation,	 and	 that	 we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 impose	 any	
statistical	 assumptions	 or	 parametric	 structure	 on	 the	 data.	We	will	 also	 present	 kernel	
density	estimates	of	the	earnings	density	functions	as	an	alternative	way	of	presenting	the	
key	 insights.	 Finally,	 we	 will	 derive	 and	 report	 statistical	 tests	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 data	
support	the	theoretical	prediction	of	stochastic	dominance.	
	
Figure	1.3a	 illustrates	 the	 cumulative	 earnings	distributions	 for	male	migrants	 to	Nordic	
countries,	 male	 migrants	 to	 destinations	 outside	 Nordic	 countries,	 and	 for	 male	 non‐
migrants.	The	values	of	 the	 standardized	earnings	are	 truncated	at	 ‐2	and	2	 to	make	 the	
graphs	more	tractable.	The	 figure	confirms	that	migrants	were	positively	selected	during	
the	 study	 period.	 The	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 of	 standardized	 earnings	 of	
migrants	to	destinations	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	clearly	located	to	the	right	of	the	
corresponding	 cumulative	 distribution	 for	 non‐migrants,	 as	 would	 be	 the	 case	 if	 the	
cumulative	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants.	 The	
16 
 
figure	also	shows	 that	 the	distribution	 function	 for	migrants	 to	other	Nordic	 countries	 is	
located	 to	 the	 right	 of	 that	 for	 non‐migrants.	 However	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 migrants	 to	
Nordic	countries	seems	weaker.	This	weaker	selection	may	arise	because	the	rate	of	return	




Figure	 1.4a	 presents	 the	 corresponding	 kernel	 estimates	 of	 the	 density	 functions	 of	 the	




As	 is	 evident	 from	 the	 figures,	 Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	 tests	 comparing	 the	 earnings	
distributions	 for	 different	 groups	 rejected	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 the	 underlying	 earnings	
distributions	 are	 the	 same	 at	 a	 highly	 significant	 level.	 In	 addition	 to	 showing	 that	 the	
cumulative	 distributions	 are	 different,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 determine	 if	 the	 evidence	
statistically	supports	the	theoretical	prediction	that	the	cumulative	distribution	function	of	
migrants	 stochastically	 dominates	 that	 of	 non‐migrants.	 Statistical	 tests	 for	 first‐order	
stochastic	dominance	are	highly	sensitive	to	small	changes	in	the	underlying	distributions,	




hypothesis.	 It	 would	 then	 make	 sense	 to	 focus	 on	 testing	 stochastic	 dominance	 over	 a	
restricted	 range	 of	 the	 distribution.	We	 apply	 an	 approach	 that	 characterizes	 the	 range	
over	which	 the	 value	of	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 for	non‐migrants	 is	 statistically	
significantly	bigger	than	that	of	non‐migrants.		
	
In	 particular,	 we	 calculate	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 cumulative	 distribution	 functions	






































of	 migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 whose	 earnings	 are	 outside	 the	 range.	 Consider	 first	 the	
distributions	 of	 non‐migrant	men	 and	men	migrating	 to	 destinations	 outside	 the	Nordic	
countries.	 Although	 it	 is	 not	 clearly	 visible	 from	 figure	 1.3a,	 table	 1.4	 shows	 that	 the	
cumulative	distribution	functions	cross	near	the	lower	tails	of	the	distributions.	Figure	1.5a	
depicts	∆෠ሺ۴ሺwሻሻ	and	 lower	 and	 upper	 bounds	 for	 a	 95%	 confidence	 interval.	 The	 lower	
bound	of	the	confidence	interval	is	positive	on	most	of	the	range	covering	the	supports	of	
the	distributions.		Only	1.3	percent	of	the	migrants	and	1.6	percent	of	the	non‐migrants	lie	
below	the	 lower	bound	of	 the	range	where	 the	 lower	bound	of	 the	confidence	 interval	 is	








migrants	 and	 0.01	 percent	 of	 the	 non‐migrants	 have	 earnings	 above	 this	 range.	 	 We	
















percent	 of	 the	 migrants	 going	 to	 Nordic	 countries	 have	 earnings	 on	 the	 range	 where	
ܮܤ෢∆ሺ۴ሺ୵ሻሻ	is	 positive.	 To	 sum	 up,	 the	 findings	 offer	 support	 to	 the	 stochastic	 dominance	
prediction	 for	 male	 and	 female	 migrants	 regardless	 of	 their	 destination,	 although	 the	
evidence	is	weaker	for	men	who	migrated	to	Nordic	countries.		
	
Additional	 support	 for	our	 theory	 comes	 from	Mexico.	Our	 theory	predicts	 that	 earnings	
distribution	 of	 migrants	 from	 Mexico	 to	 the	 United	 States	 should	 be	 stochastically	
dominated	 by	 the	 earnings	 distribution	 of	 non‐migrants.	 Fernández‐Huertas	 Moraga	
(2011)	 presents	 these	 distributions	 for	 men.	 Although	 he	 does	 not	 present	 confidence	
intervals	as	we	do,	 the	 figures	suggest	a	pattern	 that	mirrors	what	we	 find	 for	Denmark,	
reversing	 the	 curves	 for	migrants	 and	 non‐migrants.	 In	Mexico,	 the	wage	 distribution	 of	







the	 total	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 (after	 adjusting	 for	 age	 and	 year).	 We	 now	 examine	 a	
specific	component	of	earnings,	namely	the	component	due	to	unobserved	characteristics.	










First,	 selection	 in	 terms	of	unobservable	 characteristics	 sheds	 light	on	 the	 importance	of	
the	 quality	 of	 job	 matches	 relative	 to	 the	 skill	 component	 that	 is	 internationally	
transferable.	 The	 theory	 predicts	 that	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 selection	 in	 unobservable	
characteristics	depends	on	the	magnitude	of	the	correlation	coefficient	measuring	how	the	










may	 be	 “small”.	 For	 example,	 the	 residuals	 from	 the	 wage	 regression	 may	 be	 largely	
reflecting	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 existing	 job	 match	 in	 the	 Danish	 labor	 market,	 rather	 than	
measuring	the	worker’s	innate	productivity.	To	the	extent	that	the	quality	of	the	job	match	
plays	an	 important	 role	 in	generating	 the	 residual,	 the	 correlation	 in	 this	 residual	 across	
countries	would	 be	 expected	 to	 be	weak	 (in	 fact,	 a	 pure	 random	matching	model	would	
suggest	that	it	would	be	zero).	As	a	result,	there	would	be	negative	selection	in	unobserved	
















Figure	1.7a	presents	 the	 cumulative	distributions	of	wage	 residuals	 for	male	migrants	 to	
Nordic	 countries,	male	migrants	 to	destinations	outside	Nordic	 countries,	 and	male	non‐
migrants.	 The	 values	 of	 the	 residuals	 are	 truncated	 at	 ‐2	 and	 2,	 a	 range	 that	 covers	
practically	 all	 of	 the	 population.	 The	 cumulative	 distribution	 function	 of	 residuals	 for	
emigrants	who	moved	outside	the	Nordic	countries	is	located	to	the	right	of	the	cumulative	
distribution	 for	migrants	 to	Nordic	 countries,	which	 in	 turn	 is	 located	 to	 the	 right	of	 the	
cumulative	 distribution	 of	 the	 non‐migrants.	 The	 visual	 evidence,	 therefore,	 provides	 a	
strong	 indication	 that	 migrants	 are	 positively	 selected	 in	 terms	 of	 unobserved	
characteristics.	Figure	1.7b	presents	the	analogous	evidence	for	women.	The	figure	shows	
that	 female	migrants	 are	 also	 positively	 selected	 in	 terms	 of	wage	 residuals.	 As	was	 the	
case	when	comparing	 the	measure	of	pre‐migration	earnings	 in	 the	previous	section,	 the	
selection	 in	unobserved	characteristics	 is	 less	pronounced	 for	women	 than	 for	men.	One	
explanation	for	this	could	be	that	men	are	typically	primary	earners	in	couples.		
		
We	 also	 performed	Kolmogorov‐Smirnov	 tests	 on	 the	 distributions	 of	 residuals	 for	 non‐
migrants	 and	migrants	 to	 other	Nordic	 countries	 and	 for	migrants	 to	 other	 destinations	
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implies	 that	 the	 selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 documented	 in	 the	 previous	 section	
cannot	be	attributed	 solely	 to	 the	 fact	 that	migrants	are	more	 educated.	 Instead,	we	 find	
that	there	is	positive	selection	within	education	groups.	This	result	also	has	implications	on	
interpretation	 of	 earnings	 regression	 residuals	 in	 general.	 The	 residuals	 from	 wage	
regressions	are	sometimes	interpreted	as	reflecting	the	value	of	the	job	match	between	the	
worker	and	 the	employer.	 If	 a	high	value	 for	 the	 residual	only	 reflects	a	 good	match,	we	
would	then	expect	to	find	that	workers	with	large	residuals	would	be	less	likely	to	change	
jobs	and	less	prone	to	migrate.	Our	findings	clearly	reject	this	 interpretation.	 	Comparing	










of	 residuals	 covering	 most	 of	 the	 support	 of	 the	 two	 distributions.	 And	 the	 cumulative	
distribution	function	cross	only	ion	the	lower	tails	of	the	distributions.		Although	we	cannot	























above	 this	 range.	 Put	 differently,	 we	 find	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 of	 stochastic	















The	 fact	 that	 emigrants	 are	 self‐selected	 in	 their	 unobserved	 characteristics	 implies	 that	
using	 the	 observable	 characteristics	 of	migrants	 to	 predict	 their	 counterfactual	 earnings	
had	they	chosen	not	to	migrate	will	 lead	to	biased	results.	Due	to	data	constraints,	this	is	
precisely	the	empirical	exercise	conducted	by	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005),who	adopt	the	
methodology	 introduced	 by	 DiNardo,	 Fortin,	 and	 Lemieux	 (1996)	 and	 build	 a	
counterfactual	wage	density	of	what	the	Mexican	immigrants	would	have	earned	in	Mexico	
had	 they	 stayed.	 The	 actual	 wage	 density	 of	 Mexican	 “stayers”	 is	 then	 compared	 to	 the	
counterfactual	 density	 for	 migrants.	 By	 construction,	 this	 approach	 ignores	 the	 role	 of	
unobservable	characteristics	in	the	estimation	of	the	counterfactual	wage	distribution.	
	




precisely	 measure	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 bias	 resulting	 from	 carrying	 out	 a	 counterfactual	
exercise	 as	 in	 Chiquiar	 and	 Hanson	 (2005).	 In	 particular,	 we	 can	 contrast	 the	 predicted	
counterfactual	 wage	 distribution	 of	 migrants	 had	 they	 not	 moved	 to	 the	 actual	 wage	





Let	ݓ	represent	 the	 logarithm	 of	 standardized	 annual	 earnings	 as	 defined	 earlier	 (i.e.	
earnings	adjusted	for	age,	gender,	and	year	effects).	Let	݂ሺݓ|ݔሻ	be	the	density	function	of	







indicator	variable	equal	 to	one	 if	 the	 individual	migrates	 the	 following	year	and	equal	 to	
zero	 otherwise.	 Define	 further	 ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ 	as	 the	 conditional	 density	 of	 observed	








(1.20)	 	 ݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ׬݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 1ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ݀ݔ.	
	
Up	 to	 this	 point,	 the	 analysis	 reported	 in	 this	 paper	 consists	 of	 directly	 estimating	 and	
comparing	 the	 distribution	 functions	 associated	 with	 the	 densities	 in	 (1.19)	 and	 (1.20).	
Suppose	that	the	pre‐migration	earnings	density	for	non‐migrants	were	not	available.	We	
would	 instead	attempt	 to	estimate	 it	 from	the	observable	characteristics	of	 the	migrants.	
The	implied	counterfactual	distribution	is:	
	
(1.21)	 	 ො݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ ׬݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ݀ݔ.	
	
Equation	 (1.21)	 corresponds	 to	 the	density	 of	 income	 for	 non‐migrants,	 but	 it	 is	 instead	




ො݃ሺݓ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ ൌ න݂ሺݓ|ݔ, ܫ ൌ 0ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 1ሻ݄ሺݔ|ܫ ൌ 0ሻ ݀ݔ	
	 	 	 	 	






























whether	 the	worker	 is	married	and	 the	number	of	 children	 (and	an	 interaction	between	







for	 migrants	 reflects	 the	 part	 of	 self‐selection	 that	 is	 due	 to	 observable	 characteristics.	
Similarly,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 counterfactual	 and	 actual	 densities	 for	 migrants	






migrants	 and	 non‐migrants	 is	 0.245	 log	 points,	 but	 the	 difference	 between	 the	
counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants	is	0.073.	This	implies	that	
only	about	30	percent	of	the	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings	can	be	attributed	
to	 the	 observable	 characteristics	 included	 in	 the	 logit	 model,	 while	 about	 70	 percent	 is	
attributable	to	unobservable	determinants	of	productivity.	
	
The	 calculations	 in	 the	 female	 sample	 yield	 a	 difference	of	 0.157	 log	points	between	 the	
means	of	the	actual	distributions	for	migrants	and	non‐migrants	and	a	difference	of	0.074	
points	between	the	counterfactual	distribution	and	the	distribution	for	non‐migrants.	As	a	










positive	 self‐selection	 in	 the	pre‐migration	 earnings	of	women.35	The	 key	 lesson	 is	 clear:	







Equation	(1.16)	yields	an	 interesting	and	potentially	 important	 insight.	The	nature	of	 the	
selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings,	 of	 course,	 is	 given	 by	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 selection	 in	
observables	and	the	selection	in	unobservables.	Note,	however,	that	each	of	these	selection	
terms	has	a	weighting	coefficient	 that	 represents	 the	variance	 in	earnings	attributable	 to	






the	 same	 direction,	 the	 counterfactual	 exercise	 described	 in	 this	 section	 will	 inevitably	
underestimate	the	true	extent	of	positive	selection	in	pre‐migration	earnings.	Conversely,	
the	 counterfactual	 exercise	 will	 also	 attenuate	 the	 extent	 of	 “true”	 negative	 selection	 if	
there	is	negative	selection	in	both	components	of	skills.	In	fact,	Fernández‐Huertas	Moraga	
(2011)	 presents	 a	 corresponding	 analysis	 using	 survey	 data	 from	Mexico	 and	 finds	 that	
counterfactual	estimates	greatly	underestimate	the	extent	of	negative	selection	in	the	pre‐








As	 applied	 in	 the	 immigration	 literature,	 the	 Roy	model	 focuses	 solely	 on	 the	 economic	
factors	 that	 motivate	 labor	 flows	 across	 international	 borders.	 The	 modeling	 typically	
ignores	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 flows	occur	within	 a	 policy	 framework	where	 some	 receiving	
countries	 enact	 detailed	 restrictions	 specifying	 which	 potential	 migrants	 are	 admissible	
and	which	are	not.	
	
We	 can	 use	 the	 register	 data	 from	 Denmark,	 combined	 with	 the	 unique	 political	









subdivide	 the	 group	 of	 migrants	 who	moved	 outside	 Nordic	 countries	 into	 two	 groups:	
those	who	moved	to	a	country	 in	the	EU15	or	to	Switzerland,	and	those	who	moved	to	a	








annual	 income	 for	 men	 and	 figure	 1.11b	 for	 women.	 It	 is	 evident	 that	 the	 distribution	
functions	of	standardized	earnings	are	very	similar	for	the	two	groups	of	migrants.	We	also	
conducted	 the	 analysis	 using	 the	 wage	 residuals	 (not	 shown),	 and	 the	 distributions	 of	
residuals	are	also	similar	between	the	two	groups.	
	









explained	 by	 the	 possibility	 that	 migration	 costs	 or	 immigration	 restrictions	 differ	 by	
























cumulative	 earnings	 distribution	 in	 the	 year	 before	 emigration	 stochastically	 dominates	




Decomposing	 the	 self‐selection	 in	 total	 earnings	 into	 self‐selection	 in	 observable	
characteristics	and	self‐selection	in	unobservable	characteristics	(as	measured	by	residuals	
from	Mincerian	wage	regressions),	reveals	that	unobserved	abilities	play	a	dominant	role.	
For	 men,	 about	 70	 percent	 of	 the	 positive	 self‐selection	 in	 pre‐migration	 earnings	 is	
attributable	 to	 unobservable	 determinants	 of	 productivity.	 For	 women,	 the	 fraction	 is	




Mexicans	 who	 move	 to	 the	 United	 States.	 In	 short,	 the	 use	 of	 counterfactual	 earnings	
distributions	 based	 on	 observable	 characteristics	 greatly	 understate	 the	 true	 extent	 of	




base	 their	 admission	 policies	 on	 skill	 variables	 that	 are	 observed,	 whereas	much	 of	 the	
selection	of	immigrants	is	“hidden”	in	their	unobserved	characteristics.	It	can	be	expected	
that	 migrants	 will	 be	 self‐selected	 in	 terms	 of	 unobserved	 characteristics	 even	 when	
admission	restrictions	are	applied,	and	the	self‐selection	among	those	fulfilling	admission	
criteria	 can	 be	 expected	 to	 reflect	 relative	 skill	 prices.	 This	 raises	 a	 question	 about	 the	
effectiveness	of	point	systems	that	are	necessarily	based	on	observable	characteristics.	The	
importance	 of	 relative	 skill	 prices	 is	 also	 supported	 by	 our	 separate	 analyses	 of	 self‐
selection	of	Danes	migrating	to	the	countries	belonging	to	common	European	labor	market	
(excluding	other	Nordic	countries	that	have	skill	prices	similar	to	Denmark)	and	not	having	
any	 immigration	 restrictions,	 and	 the	 self‐selection	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world.	 There	 is	
virtually	no	difference	in	the	self‐selection	to	these	destination	areas,	the	main	difference	
being	that	men	to	other	European	countries	are	slightly	more	strongly	self‐selected	at	the	
upper	 parts	 of	 the	 skill	 distribution.	 If	 immigration	 restrictions	were	 to	 have	 played	 an	





Chapter 2.  











the	 most	 difficult	 to	 be	 transported.”	 Subsequently,	 Hicks	 (1932)	 concluded	 that	 the	
differences	 in	 economic	 advantages	 are	 the	 main	 causes	 for	 migration.	 Sjaastad	 (1962)	






public	 goods	 and	 that	 there	 are	 no	 economies	 of	 scale	 or	 mobility	 costs.	 In	 a	 Tiebout	





that	 immigrants	 to	 the	 United	 States	 tend	 to	 come	 from	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	 income	
distribution	 if	 there	 is	 sufficiently	 high	 correlation	 between	 individual	 earnings	 in	 the	
country	of	origin	and	expected	earnings	in	the	United	States,	in	case	of	migrating	there,	and	
if	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 has	 more	 equal	 income	 distribution	 than	 the	 United	 States.	
Subsequently,	 Dahl	 (2002)	 has	 analyzed	 self‐selected	migration	 inside	 the	 United	 States	
and	Chiquiar	and	Hanson	(2005)	migration	from	Mexico	to	the	United	States.	
	
Denmark	 and	 other	 Scandinavian	 welfare	 states	 have	 relatively	 high	 taxes,	 generous	
welfare	 services	 and	 small	 income	 differences.	 Borjas	 (1987)	 hypothesis	 predicts	 that	
Danes	with	high	earnings	capability	should	be	more	likely	to	migrate	to	rich	countries	with	
lower	taxes	and	wider	income	distribution,	like	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	
This	 suggests	 that	 emigration	decisions	 and	preferences	 for	 redistribution	might	 also	 be	
related.	 High‐earners	 have	 self‐interest	 to	 oppose	 redistribution,	 and	 to	 choose	 less	
redistributive	countries.	
	
The	 causality	 could	 also	 go	 the	 other	 way.	 Besides	 wider	 income	 differences	 than	 in	
European	welfare	states,	the	United	States	also	has	a	culture	that	is	more	oriented	towards	




be	 that	having	 lived	 in	 the	United	States	 results,	 on	average,	 in	more	American	attitudes	




and	 the	 determinants	 of	 individual	 success,	 and	 compare	 this	 to	 the	 attitudes	 of	 Danes	
living	 in	Denmark,	measured	 in	 the	European	Social	Survey	(ESS).	We	use	unique	survey	
data	on	Danes	who	had	emigrated	in	selected	years	between	1987	and	2002	and	had	not	
returned	 to	 Denmark	 by	 2007.	 The	 surveys	 were	 planned	 by	 Martin	 D.	 Munk	 (Aalborg	
University’s	 Copenhagen	 campus)	 and	 Poutvaara	 within	 the	 project	 “Danes	 Abroad:	
Economic	 and	 Social	Motivations	 for	 Emigration	 and	 Return	Migration”,	 financed	 by	 the	
Danish	 Social	 Science	 Research	 Council.	 The	 survey	 was	 implemented	 by	 Statistics	
Denmark,	 with	 the	 help	 of	 register	 data.	 It	 asked	 respondents	 to	 state	 their	 attitudes	
towards	 income	 redistribution	 and	 the	 determinants	 of	 individual	 success.	We	 study	 to	
what	 extent	 gender,	 age,	 education,	 and	 family	 situation	 explain	 attitudes	 towards	
redistribution	in	Denmark	and	among	Danes	abroad.	We	also	study	how	attitudes	towards	
redistribution	 differ	 among	 Danes	 who	 migrated	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries,	 the	 United	





for	 redistribution	 are	 formed.	 The	 standard	 theoretical	 approach	 is	 to	 assume	 that	
individual	preferences	for	redistribution	are	determined	by	whether	the	individual	would	





A	 further	 extension	 is	 to	 assume	 that	 individuals	 do	 not	 only	 care	 about	 their	 own	
consumption,	but	that	there	is	some	measure	of	income	distribution	as	an	argument	in	the	
utility	 function.	 Alesina	 and	 Giuliano	 (2011)	 distinguish	 between	 two	 cases.	 First,	 some	
measure	 of	 income	 distribution	 can	 be	 in	 the	 utility	 function	 indirectly.	 In	 this	 case	
individuals	 do	 not	 care	 about	 inequality	 per	 se	 but	 only	 about	 its	 effect	 on	 one’s	 own	
consumption.	 Externalities	 in	 education	 and	 crime	 have	 been	 proposed	 as	 channels	
through	 which	 people	 in	 the	 upper	 end	 of	 the	 income	 distribution	 could	 be	 negatively	
affected	by	inequality.	Additionally,	it	can	be	argued	that	more	inequality	creates	incentives	
to	 exercise	 more	 effort,	 and	 this	 can	 work	 in	 favour	 of	 society	 as	 a	 whole.	 Second,	 a	




People	 can	 make	 a	 distinction	 between	 income	 that	 is	 acquired	 by	 luck	 and	 income	
acquired	 by	 own	 work	 and	 effort,	 and	 this	 distinction	 can	 be	 related	 to	 preferences	 of	
redistribution	 of	 income	 (Alesina	 and	 Angeletos	 2005).	 Using	 survey	 data,	 Fong	 (2001)	
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finds	 that	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 are	 indeed	 strongly	 correlated	 with	 individual	
beliefs	about	the	extent	to	which	individuals	have	control	over	their	material	well‐being.	It	
has	 also	 been	 found	 that	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 vary	 across	 countries	 in	 a	
systematic	 way.	 People	 in	 European	 countries	 tend	 to	 prefer	 more	 redistribution	 than	
those	 in	 the	United	States	 (Alesina	et.	al.	2001,	Alesina	and	Glaeser	2004),	and	people	 in	







(2011)	 found	 a	 strong	 and	 positive	 relationship	 between	 immigrants’	 redistributive	
preferences	 and	 the	 preference	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin.	 The	 effect	 is	 robust	 to	 a	 set	 of	
controls	and	persists	 into	 the	second	generation.	Unlike	 these	previous	papers,	we	 study	
migrants	living	in	several	destination	countries	but	who	all	come	from	the	same	country	of	





analysis	and	derives	some	theoretical	predictions.	Section	3	 introduces	 the	data	sets	 that	
will	be	used	 in	 the	empirical	analysis.	 Section	4	 introduces	 the	variable	used	 to	measure	
preferences	for	redistribution	of	income	and	presents	the	distributions	of	the	variable	for	
different	groups	of	migrants,	and	section	5	does	the	same	for	the	measures	of	beliefs	about	







are	 likely	 to	 reflect	 a	 variety	 of	 factors,	 ranging	 from	 self‐interest	 and	 altruistic	
considerations	towards	one’s	family	to	social	preferences	on	what	constitutes	a	just	society.	
We	take	the	type	of	income	transfers	in	each	country	as	given,	and	focus	on	the	preferences	











Vector	࣎	denotes	 the	 tax	 rates	 in	 different	 countries,	 including	H	 for	 those	who	have	not	
migrated	and	R	and	O	for	those	who	have	migrated.	
	 	
Taking	 into	 account	 government’s	 budget	 constraint	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 taxes	may	 distort	
labor	supply,	we	can	write	individual’s	expected	lifetime	utility	as	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(2.1)	 	ܧ ௜ܷ ൌ ∑ ߚ௧ܧݑሺݓ௜௧, ࣎ሻ ൅ ∑ ∑ ߚ௧ߙ௞ܧݑሺݓ௞௧, ࣎ሻ ൅௄௞ୀଵ ܹܵܨ௜ሺ࣎ሻ೔்
ಷ
௧ୀ଴ .்೔௧ୀ଴ 	 		










The	 second	 term	 is	 related	 to	 altruistic	 considerations	 towards	 one’s	 family	 and	 close	
friends,	 with	 ௜ܶி 	denoting	 how	 many	 periods	 into	 the	 future	 individual’s	 altruistic	considerations	towards	one’s	family	and	friends	extend.	In	case	of	no	migration,	family	and	
friends	live	in	one’s	home	country.	In	case	of	migration,	an	individual	may	have	family	and	
friends	both	in	the	country	of	origin	and	the	country	of	residence.	Individual	i	cares	about	
expected	 private	 utility	 of	 K,	ܭ ∈ ሼ0,1,2,… ሽ	other	 persons,	 attaching	 utility	 weight	
ߙ௞, ߙ௞ ൒ 0	to	 their	 utility	 from	 private	 consumption	 and	 leisure.	 K=0	 would	 refer	 to	 an	individual	who	does	not	attach	a	positive	weight	to	any	other	individual	person.	
	 	
Finally,	 the	 last	 term	 refers	 to	 social	 preferences,	 related	 to	 one’s	 views	 about	 what	
constitutes	 a	 just	 society.	 Social	welfare	 function	discounts	 the	 future	 that	 the	 individual	
cares	about	with	respect	to	each	country;	this	allows	individuals	to	care	also	about	future	




terms	 of	 private	 consumption	 by	ܤ௜ሺ࣎ሻ.	Note	 that	 only	 the	 tax	 rate	 of	 the	 country	 of	residence	counts;	tax	rates	in	other	countries	have	no	effect	on	i’s	income.	A	positive	value	
implies	that	the	individual	is	net	beneficiary	from	redistribution,	a	negative	value	that	the	
sum	of	tax	payments	and	distortions	exceeds	the	value	of	benefits.	The	private	valuation	of	
the	effects	of	redistribution	on	family	and	close	friends	is	denoted	by	ܨ௜ሺ࣎ሻ.	We	assume	that	B,	F	and	SWF	are	concave	and	single‐peaked	with	 respect	 to	each	 tax	 rate	 the	 individual	
cares	 about,	 and	 flat	 with	 respect	 to	 tax	 rates	 the	 individual	 does	 not	 care	 about.	 The	










డఛ೙ .	 	 	 	 		
Our	 model	 allows	 preferences	 towards	 redistribution	 to	 enter	 the	 individual	 utility	
function	 both	 through	 pecuniary	 concerns	 and	 directly,	 along	 the	 lines	 discussed	 in	 the	
introduction.	 However,	 we	 also	 extend	 the	 model	 in	 Alesina	 and	 Giuliano	 (2011)	 by	























in	 case	 of	 no	 migration	 or	 the	 destination	 country	 in	 case	 of	 migration,	 should	 be	
decreasing	 in	 one’s	 income	 and	 increasing	 in	 one’s	 age.	 The	 positive	 effect	 of	 age	 on	
support	for	redistribution	arises	as	many	of	the	benefits	that	the	welfare	state	provides	are	
received	 after	 retirement,	 while	 remaining	 working	 life	 during	 which	 costs	 are	 paid	 is	
shorter	for	older	individuals.	Furthermore,	net	payers	to	the	redistribution	who	think	that	
a	more	 redistributive	 society	would	be	more	 just	 attach	 a	 lower	weight	 on	ܤ௜	relative	 to	ܹܵܨ௜	as	 they	 become	 older,	 pushing	 towards	 higher	 preferred	 tax	 rate.	 We	 also	 expect	women	 to	 support	 higher	 taxes	 in	 their	 country	 of	 residence,	 given	 that	 women	 earn	
typically	 less	 than	 men.	 If	 not	 controlling	 for	 income,	 we	 expect	 the	 support	 for	
redistribution	 to	 be	 lower	 among	 the	 high‐skilled,	 who	 are	 typically	 those	 with	 higher	
education.36	Relatedly,	 it	 can	 be	 expected	 that	 one’s	 support	 for	 redistribution	 in	 one’s	
country	of	residence	is	lower	in	case	one’s	partner’s	income	is	higher.	Such	an	effect	can	be	
expected	 to	be	 especially	 strong	 for	women,	 given	 that	men	 still	 usually	 earn	more	 than	
women.	In	case	of	migrants	in	the	survey	data,	this	effect	should	be	further	amplified	by	the	
fact	 that	 women	 are	 most	 often	 tied	 migrants.	 Based	 on	 this,	 we	 expect	 that	 having	 a	

















Third,	 having	 family	 members	 or	 relatives	 who	 benefit	 from	 income	 transfers	 can	 be	
expected	to	increase	one’s	support	for	redistribution	in	the	country	in	which	they	live.		
	
Fourth,	 we	 expect	 that	 those	 highlighting	 the	 role	 of	 own	 work	 and	 choices	 are	 more	
negative	 towards	 redistribution,	while	 those	viewing	also	 luck	 and	 family	background	 to	
play	an	important	role	are	more	positive.	This	should	hold	both	in	the	country	or	residence,	
as	well	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	migration	with	 respect	 to	 one’s	 country	of	 origin.	 Already	Fong	




Fifth,	 in	 the	presence	of	multiple	destinations,	we	 expect	high‐income	earners	 and	 those	
who	are	more	negative	 towards	redistribution	 to	be	more	 likely	 to	be	 living	 in	countries	
with	 lower	 taxation	 and	 higher	 returns	 to	 skills.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 high‐skilled	 choosing	
countries	with	 higher	 returns	 to	 skills	 is	 in	 line	with	Borjas	 (1987);	 Borjas	 et	 al.	 (2015)	
present	evidence	that	the	emigrants	from	Denmark	are	strongly	positively	self‐selected	not	
only	in	terms	of	their	earnings,	but	also	in	terms	of	residual	earnings.	As	that	paper	relies	
on	 register	data,	 it	 cannot	 shed	 light	on	 the	 role	 that	preferences	 towards	 redistribution	
may	play	in	the	self‐selection	of	emigrants.	Those	preferring	a	lower	level	of	redistribution	
than	 in	 their	 country	 of	 origin	may	 vote	with	 their	 feet,	migrating	 to	 less	 redistributive	









differ	with	respect	 to	 their	 concerns	 for	 family	and	 friends,	attitudes	 towards	 taxation	 in	
the	 country	of	origin	 should	depend	only	about	views	 towards	a	 just	 society,	 and	not	on	











were	 still	 abroad	 in	2007.37	Emigrants	had	 to	be	aged	18	or	more	when	 they	emigrated,	
and	 at	 most	 59	 in	 2007.	 They	 also	 had	 to	 have	 at	 least	 one	 parent	 who	 was	 born	 in	
Denmark.	 Statistics	 Denmark	 contacted	 first	 their	 parents	 or	 siblings	 to	 request	 their	
contact	 information	abroad.	Subsequently,	 they	were	asked	to	answer	a	web	scheme	in	a	
survey	that	took	place	in	June	2008.	The	overall	response	rate	among	stayers	who	could	be	
contacted	 was	 62	 percent.	 In	 the	 analysis	 of	 migrants	 we	 concentrate	 on	 Danes	 who	
migrated	to	destinations	outside	Greenland	and	the	Faroe	Islands.38	We	also	drop	survey	
respondents	who	 report	 having	 returned	 to	Denmark	when	 the	 survey	 took	 place.	With	
these	restrictions,	we	ended	up	with	a	sample	of	1979	male	and	2089	female	migrants.39	In	





The	 five	 most	 important	 residence	 countries	 for	 men	 are	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	
Kingdom,	Norway,	Sweden	and	Germany.	For	Danish	women,	the	order	is	slightly	different:	
the	United	Kingdom,	the	United	States,	Norway,	Germany,	and	Sweden.	Together,	these	five	
countries	 account	 for	 60	 percent	 of	 respondents.	 Of	 these	 five	 countries,	 Sweden	 and	
Norway	 are	 culturally,	 economically	 and	 politically	 closest	 to	 Denmark	 by	 far.	 The	
languages	are	closely	related	and	present‐day	Southern	Sweden	was	part	of	Denmark	for	
centuries.	All	 three	are	highly	redistributive	and	rich	welfare	states.	All	 in	all,	 this	means	
that	migrating	to	Sweden	or	Norway	is	very	easy	even	for	the	less	educated.	The	societies	




















Based	 on	 these	 considerations,	 we	 classify	 destination	 countries	 into	 other	 Nordic	
countries,	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 or	 Ireland,	 Canada,	 Australia	 or	 New	
Zealand,	the	rest	of	Western	Europe	and	the	rest	of	the	world.	We	study	different	English‐
speaking	 countries	 in	most	 analyses	 separately,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 whether	 the	 United	
States	stands	out	as	the	land	of	opportunities,	and	whether	migrants	to	the	United	Kingdom	
and	 Ireland	differ	 in	 their	attitudes	 from	migrants	 to	other	European	countries	 less	 than	






To	 compare	 emigrants	 with	 Danes	 living	 in	 Denmark,	 we	 use	 data	 from	 round	 4	 of	 the	
European	Social	Survey	(ESS),	conducted	in	2008/2009.	The	response	rate	for	the	survey	
in	Denmark	was	53.8%.	We	restrict	our	sample	to	those	who	were	at	least	24	or	at	most	60	






Denmark	 in	 their	 attitudes	 towards	 income	 redistribution.	We	 also	 study	 how	 attitudes	
differ	between	migrants	 to	different	destinations.	Our	hypothesis	 is	 that	migrants	would,	
on	 average,	 self‐select	 themselves	 into	 different	 countries	 also	 according	 to	 their	
redistributive	 preferences.	 This	 would	 imply	 that	 those	 migrating	 to	 less	 redistributive	
countries	 would	 have	 more	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution,	 even	 after	
controlling	for	education	and	socio‐economic	status.	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 are	 likely	 to	 reflect	
both	self‐interest	and	fairness	considerations.	In	order	to	focus	on	fairness	considerations,	
we	asked	in	our	survey	Danes	living	abroad	to	state	their	opinion	regarding	the	suggestion	
to	 increase	 income	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark.	 Another	 advantage	 from	 focusing	 on	
Denmark	 is	 that	 this	 guarantees	 a	 common	 point	 of	 reference	 to	 respondents	 living	 in	
various	countries,	and	allows	a	comparison	with	attitudes	of	Danes	 living	 in	Denmark.	 In	
the	 European	 Social	 Survey,	 attitudes	 towards	 income	 redistribution	were	measured	 by	
asking	respondents	to	state	whether	they	agree	strongly,	agree,	neither	agree	not	disagree,	
disagree	or	disagree	strongly	with	the	statement	“The	government	should	take	measures	to	
reduce	 differences	 in	 income	 levels.”	 Table	 2.2	 presents	 the	 distribution	 of	 answers	
separately	for	men	and	women.	
	







In	 our	 survey	 for	 Danes	 living	 abroad,	 preferences	 for	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark	 were	
measured	with	 the	 following	question:	 “What	 is	your	opinion	of	 a	 suggestion	 to	 increase	
taxes	on	those	with	high	incomes	in	Denmark,	and	distribute	the	money	to	those	with	low	
incomes?”	We	used	a	5‐point	scale	from	“Strongly	in	favor”	to	“Strongly	against”.	Table	2.3a	
below	 reports	 the	 answers	 by	men	 and	 table	 2.3b	 answers	 by	women,	 according	 to	 the	
destination	country	group.		
	
Tables	 2.3a	 and	 2.3b	 reveal	 that	 there	 is	 a	 big	 gender	 difference	 in	 attitudes	 towards	
income	 redistribution.	 The	 majority	 of	 men	 oppose	 a	 suggestion	 to	 increase	 income	




Nordic	countries	are	most	positive	 towards	 increasing	redistribution	 in	Denmark.	This	 is	




in	 Denmark.	 Although	 part	 of	 this	 may	 reflect	 subtle	 differences	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	
questions	 (our	 survey	 asked	 directly	 about	 redistributing	 income,	 ESS	 about	 “taking	
















different	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution	 in	 different	 destinations	 reflect	 different	
opinions	about	the	determinants	of	individual	success,	or	differences	in	generalized	trust.	
	
The	measure	 of	 beliefs	 on	 the	 determinants	 of	 success	 is	 based	 on	 the	 survey	 question:	
“Which	 of	 the	 following	 describes	 your	 standpoint	when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 determinants	 of	
material	success?”	The	answer	alternatives	were	“Success	is	mainly	determined	by	own	work	
and	choices”,	“Success	is	about	equally	determined	by	own	work	and	choices	as	well	as	luck	or	







“Generally	speaking,	would	you	say	 that	most	people	can	be	 trusted	or	 that	you	need	 to	be	
very	 careful	 in	 dealing	with	 people?”	 The	 answer	 alternatives	 were	 “Most	 people	 can	 be	
trusted”,	“Don’t	know”,	and	“Need	to	be	very	careful”.	
	
Tables	2.4a	and	2.4b	 report	 findings	 concerning	opinions	on	what	determines	 individual	
success.	 The	 majority	 of	 Danes	 in	 all	 destinations	 replied	 that	 success	 depends	 about	
equally	on	own	work	and	choices,	as	well	as	luck	or	parental	background.	37	to	48	percent	
of	men	 and	 29	 to	 44	 percent	 of	women	were	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 success	 is	 determined	




The	 emphasis	 on	 own	 work	 and	 choices	 in	 English‐speaking	 countries	 is	 in	 line	 with	








2.6.1 Preferences for redistribution 
	
The	 descriptive	 statistics	 in	 previous	 sections	 suggest	 that	 women	 are	 more	 positive	
towards	redistribution	 than	men,	and	 that	 those	who	migrated	 to	other	Nordic	 countries	
are	 more	 positive	 than	 others.	 We	 next	 study	 to	 what	 extent	 attitudes	 towards	
redistribution	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 residence	 country	 group,	 when	 controlling	 for	
characteristics	that	have	been	shown	earlier	to	affect	attitudes	towards	redistribution.	To	




As	 a	 point	 of	 comparison,	 we	 first	 report	 as	 table	 2.6	 ordered	 logit	 analysis	 on	 to	what	
extent	age,	family	situation	(measured	by	an	indicator	variable	for	being	married	or	having	
a	registered	partner,	and	an	indicator	for	having	children)	and	dummies	for	two	education	
categories	 (short	 or	 medium	 higher	 education	 and	 master’s	 degree	 or	 higher)	 explain	
attitudes	towards	income	equalization	among	Danes	living	in	Denmark.	Among	men,	only	







of	 having	 a	 master’s	 degree	 or	 more	 is	 clearly	 negative,	 but	 does	 not	 reach	 statistical	
significance.	Among	women,	being	married	reduced	support	for	redistribution.	
	
Table	 2.7	 presents	 a	 corresponding	 analysis	 for	 Danish	 emigrants	 with	 the	 same	
explanatory	 variables.	 Among	men	who	 have	 emigrated,	 both	 short	 and	medium	 degree	
higher	education	and	master’s	degree	or	more	clearly	and	statistically	significantly	reduce	




Table	 2.8	 introduces	migration	 related	 variables	 by	 including	 destination	 country	 group	
dummies	with	Nordic	Countries	as	the	omitted	category,	dummies	 family	related	and	work	




from	 the	 literature.	 The	 coefficient	 for	 the	 occupation	 category	 high	skilled	 is	 large	 and	
negative,	and	 those	with	higher	education	are	more	negative.	Further,	men	migrating	 for	
work‐related	 reasons	are	more	negative	 towards	 redistribution.	Male	migrants	 to	Anglo‐
Saxon	countries,	 the	rest	of	Western	Europe	and	the	rest	of	 the	world	are	more	negative	
towards	 increasing	 redistribution	 in	 Denmark	 than	 migrants	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries.	
Surprisingly,	 the	 negative	 coefficients	 for	 other	 English‐speaking	 countries	 (Australia,	
Canada,	Ireland,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	Kingdom)	are	bigger	than	the	coefficient	for	
the	United	States.	If	migrants	self‐select	to	countries	that	offer	the	highest	after‐tax	income	




smaller	 than	 residing	 in	 the	 Nordic	 countries,	 holding	 all	 other	 variables	 constant.	 For	
comparison,	 residing	 in	 the	 UK	 or	 Ireland	 makes	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.09	 standard	
deviations	 smaller.	 Work‐related	 reason	 for	 migrating	 makes	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.11	
standard	 deviations	 smaller	 holding	 all	 other	 variables	 constant.	 Having	 a	 high‐skilled	
occupation	 is	 the	 most	 significant	 determinant	 of	 preferences	 as	 having	 a	 high‐skilled	
occupation	 instead	 of	 a	 low‐skilled	 one	 makes	 the	 the	 latent	 variable	 0.17	 standard	
deviations	smaller	 in	comparison	 to	having	a	 low‐skilled	occupation.	The	main	 finding	 is	
that	the	men	migrating	for	work‐related	reasons	and	men	residing	in	destinations	outside	





associated	with	more	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 redistribution.	 As	 in	 the	 regression	 for	






coefficient	 and	 being	 a	medium	 skilled	worker	 has	 a	 positive	 coefficient.	 In	 general,	 the	
estimated	 effects	 for	women	 are	much	weaker	 than	 in	 the	 corresponding	 regression	 for	
men.	 The	 dummies	 for	 the	 educational	 level	 have	 insignificant	 coefficients,	 and	 more	
importantly,	the	coefficients	for	destination	country	group	are	all	insignificant.		
	
A	possible	explanation	 for	 the	gender	differences	 in	destination	country	dummies	 is	 that	
many	 of	 the	women	 in	 the	 data	 are	 so	 called	 tied	migrants	who	 have	migrated	 because	




their	 attitudes	 than	 their	 individual	 characteristics.	 2.9	 extends	 the	 set	 of	 explanatory	
variables	 to	 include	 indicator	 variables	 for	 the	 occupation	 of	 the	 spouse.	 The	 estimated	













also	 the	general	effect	of	having	a	 spouse,	with	 reference	category	being	 those	without	a	
spouse.	
	




test	 whether	 differences	 between	 different	 destinations	 are	 driven	 by	 such	 attitude	
differences,	or	persist	even	after	controlling	for	them.	For	example,	 it	could	be	that	those	
who	are	most	convinced	that	 individual	success	 is	determined	by	 individual	effort	would	



















In	 line	with	Fong	 (2001),	 both	men	and	women	are	more	 likely	 to	be	 against	 increasing	
redistribution	 if	 they	 are	 of	 the	 opinion	 that	 individual	 success	 depends	mainly	 on	 own	
work	 and	 choices.	 For	 men,	 looking	 at	 the	 marginal	 effects	 the	 effect	 is	 of	 the	 same	
magnitude	as	the	effect	of	migrating	for	work‐related	reasons.	For	women,	the	coefficient	is	
larger	than	the	coefficient	of	being	married	or	differences	between	different	destinations.	
Looking	 at	marginal	 effects	 for	women,	 the	 belief	 that	 own	work	 and	 choices	 determine	
success	 makes	 the	 latent	 preference	 variable	 0.13	 standard	 deviations	 smaller	 holding	















searched	 respondents’	 siblings	 from	 the	 Danish	 population	 register,	 and	 ran	 regression	
using	an	 indicator	variable	benefit	 for	having	a	 sibling	who	resided	 in	Denmark	and	was	
unemployed	 or	 on	 early	 retirement	 in	 2007.	 Unemployment	 and	 retirement	 status	 are	
measured	at	 the	end	of	November	each	year,	 so	 the	 last	 calendar	year	before	 the	survey	
took	 place	was	 used.	 As	 reported	 in	 table	 2.12,	 the	 coefficient	 for	 the	 indicator	 variable	
benefit	 is	 statistically	 insignificant	 for	 men,	 but	 large	 and	 significant	 for	 women.	 The	
findings	 suggest	 that	women’s	 support	 for	 redistribution	 is	 to	a	greater	extent	driven	by	
the	 interest	of	their	kin	than	men’s	support.	Possible	 interpretation	could	be	that	women	






2.6.4 Selection or assimilation? 
	







and	 economic	 beliefs	 are	 formed	 mostly	 during	 youth	 and	 early	 adulthood	 and	 are	
resistant	 to	 change	 afterwards.	 Krosnick	 and	 Alwin,	 (1989)	 have	 found	 evidence	 of	
significant	socialization	between	18	and	25	years	of	age.	If	assimilation	is	more	important	
than	selection,	and	if	younger	migrants	are	more	prone	to	assimilate,	we	would	expect	to	
find	 stronger	 association	 between	 preferences	 and	 destination	 countries	 for	 those	 who	
have	migrated	at	a	young	age.	A	 testable	 implication	of	 this	hypothesis	 is	 that	 those	who	
migrated	to	the	United	States	and	to	other	English‐speaking	countries	at	young	age	should	
have	more	negative	attitudes	towards	redistribution	than	those	who	migrated	at	an	older	




Tables	 2.13a	 	 and	 2.13b	 present	 regression	 results	 for	 men	 and	 women	 who	 have	




assimilating	 to	 political	 values	 prevalent	 in	 the	 host	 country.	 The	 coefficients	 for	 age	 at	
migration	in	the	regression	for	the	United	States	are	statistically	insignificant	for	both	men	




2.6.5 Plans to return to Denmark 
	















high	 skilled	 occupation	 are	 significant	 for	 both	 men	 and	 women	 who	 plan	 to	 return	 to	
Denmark,	but	insignificant	for	those	who	do	not	plan	to	return.	For	men,	the	coefficients	for	
the	destination	country	groups	are	 significant	 for	both	 those	who	are	planning	 to	 return	
and	those	who	don’t.	 	A	possible	 interpretation	 for	this	 finding	could	be	that	self‐interest	










We	 found	 a	 remarkable	 gender	 difference	 among	 emigrants:	 the	 majority	 of	 men	 are	




















would	 expect,	 those	 who	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 individual	 choices	 and	 effort	 as	
determinants	of	individual	success	are	more	negative	towards	redistribution,	as	are	those	
who	 have	 a	 lower	 trust	 in	 people	 in	 general.	 Still,	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 different	
attitudes,	 we	 find	 that	 Danes	 who	 migrate	 to	 other	 Nordic	 countries	 are	 more	 positive	
towards	 increasing	 income	 redistribution	 than	 Danish	 men	 who	 migrate	 to	 any	 other	
destination.	 Among	 women,	 the	 association	 between	 redistributive	 preferences	 and	
destination	 choice	 is	 much	 weaker.	 Instead,	 spousal	 occupation	 plays	 a	 big	 role,	 with	
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Empirical	 evidence	 also	 suggests	 that	 trust	 is	 associated	 with	 important	 economic	 and	
social	 outcomes.	 Trust	 has	 for	 instance	 been	 shown	 to	 correlate	with	 indicators	 of	 good	
government	(La	Porta	et	al.,	1997,	1999)	as	well	as	with	such	favorable	economic	outcomes	
as	 higher	 and	 more	 equal	 incomes	 and	 better	 institutions	 (Knack	 and	 Keefer,	 1997).	
However,	 the	causal	relationship	between	trust	and	 institutions	or	economic	outcomes	 is	
ambiguous.	 In	 recent	 studies	Tabellini	 (2008,	2010)	uses	 instrumental	variables	 to	 show	
that	 historical	 political	 institutions	 transmit	 trust,	 and	 that	 this	 inherited	 trust	 affects	
income.	 The	 link	 between	 trust	 and	 macro	 economy	 is	 established	 by	 Algan	 and	 Cahuc	





Also	other	papers	have	found	that	trust	 is	persistent	 in	time	and	 is	transmitted	from	one	
generation	 to	 the	 next.	 Dohmen	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 use	 data	 from	 the	German	 Socio‐Economic	
Panel	(SOEP)	to	study	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	in	the	family.	Using	a	sample	
of	 parents	 and	 their	 grown	 up	 children,	 they	 find	 a	 strong	 positive	 correlation	 between	
trust	of	parents	and	their	children.	Evidence	of	intergenerational	transmission	of	trust	has	
also	been	found	in	a	number	of	other	papers	using	data	on	immigrants.	Guiso	et.	Al	(2006)	
find	 that	 trust	of	 immigrants	 in	 the	United	States	 is	 correlated	with	 region	or	 country	of	
ancestry	 fixed	 effects	 and	 Uslaner	 (2008)	 finds	 that	 trust	 in	 nine	 countries	 of	 origin	
explains	 a	 significant	 share	 of	 the	 trust	 of	 immigrants	 residing	 in	 the	 United	 States.		
Moschion	and	Tabasso	(2013)	study	descendants	of	immigrants	in	Australia	and	the	United	







European	 Social	 Survey	 and	 World	 Values	 Survey.	 The	 paper	 studies	 children	 of	
immigrants	 in	 29	 European	 countries	 and	 estimates	 a	 strong	 intergenerational	









surveys	such	as	 the	General	Social	Survey,	and	most	of	 the	earlier	 literature	doing	cross‐
country	comparisons	or	studying	migrants	has	based	the	measure	of	trust	on	it.42	However,	
the	 question	 concerns	 a	 special	 type	 of	 trust	 that	 can	 be	 called	 generalized	 trust.	 As	
Bjørnskov	(2006)	points	out,	it	is	not	clear	to	respondents,	what	kinds	of	people,	situations	





in	 police	 among	 immigrants,	 but	 samples	 of	 native	 residents	 and	 descendants	 of	
immigrants	 are	 also	 analyzed	 to	 provide	 a	 point	 of	 comparison.	 Intergenerational	 and	
cultural	 transmission	 of	 generalized	 trust	 is	 already	 well	 established	 in	 the	 empirical	
literature,	 but	 less	 is	 known	 about	 the	 transmission	 of	 this	 type	 of	 particularized	 trust	
towards	a	specific	institution.	It	could	for	instance	be	the	case	that	a	more	particular	type	of	
trust	would	not	be	as	strongly	transmitted	from	the	origin	as	generalized	trust	is	according	
to	 results	 of	 Ljunge	 (2014).	 One	 reason	 for	 this	 could	 be,	 that	 immigrants	 gather	
information	 about	 the	 of	 the	 institutions	 and	 their	 trustworthiness	 in	 the	 country	 of	
residence	and	adjust	their	trust	towards	the	institutions	according	to	this	new	information.	












in	 the	 countries	 of	 origin	 of	 European	 immigrants,	 but	 in	 a	 surprising	 way;	 individuals	
originating	from	countries	with	low	trust	 in	police	tend	to	be	more	trustful.	I	further	find	
that	 the	 result	 is	 driven	 by	migrants	who	 come	 from	 countries	 of	 origin	where	 average	
trust	 in	 police	 is	 lower	 than	 in	 the	 country	 of	 residence.	 Analyzing	 the	 sample	 of	 the	








trust	 is	 analyzed.	 Even	 though	 Ljunge	 (2014)	 provides	 a	 thorough	 analysis	 of	 the	
transmission	 of	 generalized	 trust,	 similar	 regressions	 are	 presented	 to	 highlight	 the	
differences	 between	 results	 concerning	 generalized	 trust	 and	 trust	 towards	 a	 specific	
institution.			
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 structured	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 discusses	 the	 empirical	





As	 was	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 empirical	 specification	 follows	 closely	 the	 method	 used	 by	
Luttmer	 and	 Singhal	 (2011)	 and	Ljunge	 (2014).	 The	 analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	model	 of	 the	
form	
	
(3.1)	 	 ܶݎݑݏݐ௜௖௔௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܯ݁ܽ݊_ܶݎݑݏݐ௔ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܺ௖௔௧ ൅ ߛ௖ ൅ ߜ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௖௔௧.	 		
The	 dependent	 variable	ܶݎݑݏݐ௜௖௔௧	is	 the	 trust	 of	 individual	݅,	 residing	 in	 country	ܿ	with	origin	 in	country	ܽ		 in	period	ݐ.	The	variable	of	main	 interest	 is	 the	average	 level	of	 trust	
among	natives	in	the	country	of	origin	ܯ݁ܽ݊_ܶݎݑݏݐ௔.		Mean	trust	is	a	characteristics	of	the	country	 of	 origin	 and	 is	 as	 such	 common	 to	 all	 individuals	 who	 were	 born	 in	 a	 given	
country	and	it	reflects	both	objective	characteristics	and	cultural	influences	of	the	country	
of	origin.	The	same	model	can	be	used	for	studying	both	first	generation	migrants	and	their	
descendants.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 first	 generation	 migrants	 country	ܽ	refers	 to	 the	 country	 of	
birth	of	the	migrant,	whereas	in	the	case	of	descendants	of	migrants	it	refers	to	the	country	
of	 birth	 of	 the	 parent	who	 has	migrated	 from	 the	 country.	 ௜ܺ௖௔௧captures	 such	 individual	characteristics	as	age,	gender,	marital	 status,	 income	and	education	that	may	affect	 trust.	
Further,	the	residence	country	fixed	effect	ߛ௖	captures	such	characteristics	of	the	residence	country	as	the	quality	of	political	institutions	that	may	affect	individual	trust,	but	also	the	
effect	of	cultural	influences.	Due	to	the	country	fixed	effect	all	the	unobserved	differences	















migrants	 and	 their	 children,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 countries	 of	 origin.	 As	 such,	 the	 data	 allows	







of	 immigrants	 consists	 of	 respondents	who	 have	 at	 least	 one	 parent	who	was	 born	 in	 a	
different	 survey	 country.	 If	 both	 parents	 were	 migrants	 but	 were	 born	 in	 different	
countries	the	individual	was	dropped	from	the	sample.	The	migration	flows	of	immigrants	
in	 the	 data	 are	 described	 in	 Table	 3.1	 that	 shows	 the	 numbers	 of	migrants	 having	 been	
born	in	different	countries	of	origin,	as	well	as	the	biggest	destinations	for	each	origin.	
	
The	 variable	 of	 main	 interest,	 trust	 in	 police,	 is	 based	 on	 the	 European	 Social	 Survey	
question	about	trust	in	different	institutions,	where	police	is	one	of	the	institutions	that	is	
mentioned	 to	 the	 respondent.	 The	 question	 reads:	 ”Using	 this	 card,	 please	 tell	 me	 on	 a	
score	of	0‐10	how	much	you	personally	 trust	each	of	 the	 institutions	I	read	out.	0	means	
you	do	not	 trust	 an	 institution	 at	 all,	 and	10	means	 you	have	 complete	 trust.”	The	 same	
coding	 to	 the	 answer	 is	 used	 in	 the	 analysis,	 so	 that	 a	 higher	 value	 means	 that	 the	
respondent	expresses	a	stronger	agreement	with	the	statement.	Generalized	trust	in	others	




in	 case	 of	 the	 sample	 of	 immigrants,	 and	 trust	 in	 police	 in	 the	 parent’s	 country	 of	 birth	
when	 the	 sample	 of	 children	 of	 immigrants	 is	 analyzed.	 The	 average	 trust	 is	 computed	





observed	 in	 the	data.	 In	 the	regressions,	marital	 status	 is	captured	by	 indicator	variables	
for	 being	 divorced,	 widowed	 or	 having	 never	 been	 married,	 and	 education	 level	 by	
indicator	variables	 for	 tertiary	and	primary	education.	For	 labor	market	 status,	 indicator	
variables	for	having	been	unemployed	and	for	having	done	paid	work	the	week	before	the	
survey	 interview	are	 included,	and	 the	omitted	category	 is	having	been	outside	 the	 labor	
force.	 The	 income	 measure	 being	 used	 is	 based	 on	 income	 deciles	 in	 the	 country	 of	
residence.	The	indicator	variable	for	low	income	stands	for	the	bottom	three	deciles	in	the	





Results	 from	 the	 regressions	 explaining	 generalized	 trust	 for	 the	 samples	 of	 natives,	
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Results	 from	 the	 regression	 explaining	 trust	 in	 police	 are	 reported	 in	 table	 3.3	
Concentrating	 first	 on	 the	 sample	 of	 natives,	 the	 comparison	 with	 the	 corresponding	
regression	explaining	generalized	 trust	 reveals	 some	 interesting	differences.	Women	and	







statistically	 significant	 negative	 coefficient	 meaning	 that	 immigrants	 originating	 from	
countries	where	 the	 average	 trust	 in	 police	 is	 low	 tend	 to	 be	more	 trustful.	 Further,	 no	
significant	 effect	 of	 the	 trust	 level	 in	 the	 country	 of	 birth	 of	 the	 parent	 is	 found	 for	 the	
children	of	 immigrants.	The	 latter	 result	 is	more	 intuitive,	 as	 the	 interpretation	 could	be	
that	 trust	 towards	 a	 particular	 institution	 would	 be	 based	 on	 information	 on	 the	 true	
trustworthiness	of	the	institution.		If	this	was	the	case,	then	individual	trust	in	police	could	
be	based	on	knowledge	of	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 police	 in	 the	 country	of	 residence,	 and	




origin	 for	 the	 immigrants	 could	 be	 that	 migrants	 who	 come	 from	 countries	 where	 the	
average	trust	in	police	is	low	but	who	reside	in	countries	where	police	is	considered	to	be	
more	trustworthy	would	value	the	trustworthiness	relatively	high.	I	study	whether	this	is	










In	 this	 paper,	 I	 have	 studied	 transmission	 of	 trust	 towards	 police	 across	 countries	 and	
generations	among	immigrants	and	their	children.	The	relationship	between	average	trust	
in	police	in	the	country	of	origin	and	individual	trust	in	police	among	immigrants	and	their	
children	 is	 strikingly	 different	 from	 the	 corresponding	 findings	 concerning	 generalized	
trust.	In	case	of	generalized	trust,	the	levels	of	trust	in	the	countries	of	origin	are	positively	
correlated	with	 individual	trust	 levels	of	 immigrants	and	the	effect	persists	to	the	second	
48 
 
generation.	 However,	 the	 average	 trust	 in	 police	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 has	 a	 negative	
effect	on	individual	trust	among	immigrants,	and	no	effect	at	all	on	the	trust	 levels	of	the	
children	of	immigrants.	The	effect	on	the	trust	level	of	immigrants	is	driven	by	immigrants	
residing	 in	 countries	 where	 trust	 in	 police	 is	 higher	 than	 in	 the	 country	 of	 origin.	 One	






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Non-migrant men Migrant men 
Non-migrant 
women Migrant women 
Observations 6450665 7323 5163129 3436 
Age     
Average 39.8 33.0 40.2 35 





    
Average 52725 68151 40299 46412 





    
Average 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 











 Men Women 
Sweden 1466 699 
The United States            763 363 
The United Kingdom  725 432 
Germany 560 249 
Norway 576 273 
Spain 255 147 
Switzerland 233  118 
France 222 156 











 Men Women 













school 21.4 19.8 8.3 21.5 15.7 8.9 
High school 3.2 7.8 8.6 3.1 6.9 8.9 
Vocational 




5.6 5.7 6.6 4.9 5.1 7.8 
Bachelor or 
equivalent 12.2 11.6            20.6	 23.3 22.9 25.4 
Master’s or 
equivalent 7.3 10.6 23.9 5.1 12.3 17.6 
Doctoral or 






























     
Migrants outside Nordic 
Zone and non-migrants 
    
Male 1.3 1.6 0.0 0.0 
     
     
Female 2.0 2.5 0.2 0.0 
     
     
Migrants to Nordic Zone 
and non-migrants 
    
Male 9.9 11.9 0.9 0.5 
     
     
Female 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.2 
     












 (1) men (2) women 
 b se B se 
Married 0.068***\ (0.00) -0.016*** (0.00) 
Children 0.025*** (0.00) -0.048*** (0.00) 
High school 0.224*** (0.00) 0.190*** (0.00) 
Vocational school  0.092*** (0.00) 0.089*** (0.00) 
Advanced vocational  0.186*** (0.00) 0.198*** (0.00) 
Bachelor   0.298*** (0.00) 0.225*** (0.00) 
Master’s  0.498*** (0.00) 0.536*** (0.00) 
PhD 0.490*** (0.00) 0.622*** (0.00) 
1996 0.020*** (0.00) 0.017*** (0.00) 
1997 0.043*** (0.00) 0.041*** (0.00) 
1998 0.078*** (0.00) 0.083*** (0.00) 
1999 0.103*** (0.00) 0.112*** (0.00) 
2000 0.141*** (0.00) 0.143*** (0.00) 
2001 0.175*** (0.00) 0.175*** (0.00) 
2002 0.207*** (0.00) 0.210*** (0.00) 
2oo3 0.236*** (0.00) 0.235*** (0.00) 
2004 0.252*** (0.00) 0.258*** (0.00) 
Constant 















*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The table reports OLS results for the log annual earnings. 
Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 

























     
Migrants outside Nordic 
Zone and non-migrants 
    
Male 5.6 6.2 0.0 0.0 
     
     
Female 12.4 14.0 0.3 0.0 
     
     
Migrants to Nordic Zone 
and non-migrants 
    
Male 12.0 13.4 1.1 0.7 
     
     
Female 8.8 0.9 1.6 11.1 
     












 (1) men (2) women 
 b se B se 
Married -0.110**   (0.04)  -0.191*** (0.05)  
Children -1.137*** (0.05)  -1.232*** (0.07)  
 Married*children 0.460*** (0.07)  0.374*** (0.09)  
 High school 1.377*** (0.05)  1.158*** (0.08)  
 Vocational school 0.186*** (0.04)  0.159** (0.06)  
 Advanced vocational 0.648*** (0.06)  0.714*** (0.08)  
Bachelor 1.097*** (0.04)  0.581***        (0.06) 
Master’s 1.652*** (0.04)  1.444***        (0.07) 
PhD 1.723*** (0.10)  1.655***        (0.21) 
y1996 -0.032  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1997 0.002  (0.06)  -0.016  (0.08)  
y1998 -0.024  (0.06)  -0.001  (0.08)  
y1999 0.230*** (0.05)  0.131  (0.08)  
y2000 0.260*** (0.06)  0.238** (0.09)  
y2001 0.161** (0.05)  0.146  (0.08)  
y2002 0.208*** (0.05) 0.046 (0.08) 
y2003 0.198*** (0.05) 0.112 (0.08) 
y2004 0.246*** (0.05) 0.178* (0.08) 
Constant -6.700*** (0.08)  -6.951*** (0.12)  
N 6470720   5173706  
Pseudo ܴଶ 0.0540  0.0557  
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The table reports logit results for the long-term emigration. 
Individually clustered standard errors are in parentheses. 
















 Men Women 
Non-migrant average ‐0,065 ‐0,040
Estimated average for migrants 0,008 0,034 
True average for migrants 0,180 0,117





Share of the actual difference explained 









 Men Women 
   
Other Nordic countries 409 445 
The United States                               338 285 
UK or Ireland  285 418 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 128 128 
Rest of Western Europe 561 700 
Rest of the world 258 113 
total 1979  2089 







 Strongly against 
Somewhat 
against 






 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Men 10 32 19 28 11 
Women 4 30 21 32 13 













 Strongly against 
Somewhat 
against 






 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Other Nordic countries 25 17 11 29 27 
The United States                          32 23 12 22 11 
UK or Ireland 40 19 10 19 12 
Canada, Australia, or New 
Zealand 34 19 12 20 15 
Rest of Western Europe 38 22 8 23 9 
Rest of the world 40 26 6 15 12 





 Strongly against 
Somewhat 
against 






 Row % Row % Row % Row % Row % 
      
Other Nordic countries 15 16 11 33 25 
The United States                          19 19 11 29 21 
UK or Ireland 15 17 13 32 23 
Canada, Australia, or New 
Zealand 12 19 11 38 20 
Rest of Western Europe 15 20 13 33 19 
Rest of the world 16 24 10 29 22 



























 Own work and choices Both Luck or parental background 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 39 58 2 
The United States                               48 51 0 
UK or Ireland 41 59 0 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 47 53 0 
Rest of Western Europe 37 62 1 
Rest of the world 37 63 0 





 Own work and choices Both Luck or parental background 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 36 62 2 
The United States                               39 61 0 
UK or Ireland 37 63 0 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 44 56 0 
Rest of Western Europe 29 70 2 
Rest of the world 32 66 2 





 Need to be very careful Don’t know Most people can be trusted 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 11 3 86 
The United States                               17 6 78 
UK or Ireland 17 5 78 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 20 4 77 
Rest of Western Europe 17 5 78 
Rest of the world 23 3 74 




 Need to be very careful Don’t know Most people can be trusted 
 Row % Row % Row % 
    
Other Nordic countries 9 3 88 
The United States                               16 7 77 
UK or Ireland 14 5 81 
Canada, Australia, or New Zealand 17 5 78 
Rest of Western Europe 16 7 77 
Rest of the world 15 8 77 







 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.018* 0.020* 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.074 -0.535** 
 (0.20) (0.19) 
Children -0.124 0.108 
 (0.19) (0.20) 




Master’s degree or higher -0.398 0.068 







*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  





 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.016* 0.027*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married -0.059 -0.302** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.026 -0.023 
 (0.10) (0.10) 




Master’s degree or higher -0.414*** -0.144 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  



















 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.021** 0.032*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.052 -0.263** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.070 -0.036 
 (0.10) (0.10) 




Master’s degree or higher -0.042 0.016 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.233 0.212 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.663*** -0.427*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
US -0.305* -0.214 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.499*** -0.019 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.584** 0.017 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.495*** -0.143 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.488** -0.161 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.433*** -0.118 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.216 -0.156 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  























 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.028** 0.033*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Children -0.163 -0.047 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Short or medium higher  -0.190 -0.022 
education (0.13) (0.13) 
Master’s degree or higher 0.042 0.185 (0.13) (0.15) 
Medium skilled 0.438** 0.324* 
 (0.16) (0.15) 
High skilled -0.639*** -0.255 
 (0.12) (0.15) 
Spouse medium skilled 0.290* 0.304* 
 (0.14) (0.15) 
Spouse high skilled -0.095 -0.424*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
US -0.318* -0.154 
 (0.16) (0.18) 
UK or Ireland -0.428* -0.038 
 (0.18) (0.17) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.627** 0.200 
 (0.23) (0.23) 
Rest of Europe -0.522*** -0.013 
 (0.16) (0.14) 
Rest of the World -0.338 -0.035 
 (0.18) (0.24) 
Work related -0.464*** -0.064 
 (0.13) (0.16) 
Partner or family related 0.114 -0.065 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  






















 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.052** 0.026* 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Children 0.025 -0.096 
 (0.20) (0.18) 




Master’s degree or higher 0.012 -0.074 
 (0.24) (0.18) 
Medium skilled 0.527* 0.135 
 (0.26) (0.17) 
High skilled -0.486* -0.371 
 (0.22) (0.20) 
Spouse*spouse low skilled -0.010 0.018 





Spouse*spouse high skilled -0.316 -0.476** 
 (0.25) (0.17) 
US -0.141 -0.368 
 (0.36) (0.22) 
UK or Ireland -0.509 -0.114 
 (0.31) (0.19) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.854* 0.207 
 (0.36) (0.24) 
Rest of Western Europe -0.384 -0.183 
 (0.23) (0.17) 
Rest of the world 0.148 -0.513 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  























 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.018* 0.030*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.041 -0.265** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.057 -0.030 
 (0.10) (0.10) 




Master’s degree or higher -0.121 -0.117 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.175 0.179 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.658*** -0.413*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Own work and choices -0.465*** -0.495*** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Low trust -0.240* -0.425*** 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
US -0.244 -0.198 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.496*** -0.019 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.536** 0.054 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.504*** -0.168 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.488** -0.137 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.437*** -0.110 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.187 -0.179 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  



















 Men Women 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.021** 0.032*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Married 0.051 -0.260** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Children -0.070 -0.035 
 (0.10) (0.10) 




Master’s degree or higher -0.043 0.031 
 (0.11) (0.12) 
Medium skilled 0.231 0.215 
 (0.13) (0.12) 
High skilled -0.662*** -0.431*** 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
US -0.304* -0.222 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
UK or Ireland -0.494*** -0.015 
 (0.15) (0.13) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.580** 0.028 
 (0.20) (0.18) 
Rest of Europe -0.493*** -0.143 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
Rest of the World -0.486** -0.166 
 (0.15) (0.21) 
Work related -0.433*** -0.115 
 (0.10) (0.12) 
Partner or family related 0.216 -0.152 
 (0.12) (0.10) 
Benefit 0.131 0.540* 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  





















 Nordic US UK  or IE CA, AU or NZ 
Other western 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
Age 0.019 0.038* 0.030 0.027 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Married -0.117 -0.027 0.297 -0.196 -0.074 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) (0.48) (0.19) 
Children 0.244 -0.119 -0.124 0.078 -0.013 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.40) (0.19) 
Short or medium 
higher education 
-0.146 -0.545 -0.007 -0.514 -0.247 
(0.23) (0.29) (0.30) (0.44) (0.21) 
Master’s degree or 
higher 
0.417 -0.097 -0.326 -0.363 0.031 
(0.25) (0.30) (0.27) (0.45) (0.23) 
Medium skilled 0.001 0.285 0.657 1.039 0.066 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.38) (0.59) (0.23) 
High skilled -1.057*** -0.757** -0.770** 0.095 -0.605** 
 (0.24) (0.25) (0.26) (0.40) (0.20) 
Work related -0.681** 0.034 -0.600* 0.165 -0.473* 
 (0.25) (0.24) (0.30) (0.40) (0.19) 
Partner or family 
related 
0.043 0.895** 0.073 0.561 0.324 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.46) (0.42) (0.27) 
Young migration age -0.313 -0.136 0.663* 0.790 0.220 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.31) (0.61) (0.26) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
392 320 271 123 532 
0.0405 0.0398 0.0560 0.0241 0.0256 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     



























 Nordic US UK  or IE CA, AU or NZ 
Other western 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
Age 0.079*** 0.034 0.010 0.012 0.027 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
Married -0.418* -0.313 -0.459* -0.228 0.007 
 (0.20) (0.30) (0.19) (0.51) (0.19) 
Children 0.091 -0.442 -0.102 0.544 -0.062 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.19) (0.46) (0.21) 
Short or medium 
higher education 
0.165 -0.022 0.016 -0.046 0.025 
(0.26) (0.28) (0.22) (0.40) (0.18) 
Master’s degree or 
higher 
0.210 -0.078 0.018 0.602 -0.044 
(0.29) (0.32) (0.26) (0.55) (0.21) 
Medium skilled 0.003 0.136 0.384 -0.621 0.460* 
 (0.24) (0.40) (0.26) (0.53) (0.22) 
High skilled -0.947*** 0.145 -0.513* -0.332 -0.247 
 (0.26) (0.33) (0.26) (0.49) (0.22) 
Work related 0.398 -0.069 -0.585* -1.018 -0.143 
 (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) (0.54) (0.21) 
Partner or family 
related 
0.114 -0.264 -0.258 0.157 -0.099 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.21) (0.46) (0.18) 
Young migration age 0.495 -0.060 0.347 -0.358 0.186 
 (0.27) (0.29) (0.22) (0.54) (0.17) 
N 
pseudo R-squared 
409 260 392 118 614 
0.0371 0.0108 0.0208 0.0345 0.0073 
*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001     




























 Plans to return No plans to return 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.017* 0.036 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Married 0.135 -0.363 
 (0.11) (0.26) 
Children -0.008 -0.469 
 (0.11) (0.28) 




Master’s degree or higher 0.025 -0.482 
 (0.12) (0.29) 
Medium skilled 0.218 0.176 
 (0.13) (0.49) 
High skilled -0.701*** -0.482 
 (0.11) (0.25) 
US -0.308* -0.394 
 (0.14) (0.40) 
UK or Ireland -0.408* -1.007* 
 (0.16) (0.40) 
CA, AU or NZ -0.461* -1.547* 
 (0.21) (0.65) 
Rest of Europe -0.447*** -0.904** 
 (0.13) (0.33) 
Rest of the World -0.450** -0.904* 
 (0.17) (0.42) 
Work related -0.382*** -0.673* 
 (0.11) (0.28) 
Partner or family related 0.255 -0.048 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  






















 Plans to return No plans to return 
 b/se b/se 
   
Age 0.034*** 0.022 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Married -0.217* -0.576* 
 (0.11) (0.24) 
Children -0.015 -0.215 
 (0.12) (0.25) 




Master’s degree or higher 0.063 -0.233 
 (0.13) (0.32) 
Medium skilled 0.206 0.231 
 (0.13) (0.32) 
High skilled -0.504*** 0.116 
 (0.13) (0.33) 
US -0.357* 0.746 
 (0.17) (0.40) 
UK or Ireland -0.117 0.543 
 (0.14) (0.36) 
CA, AU or NZ 0.059 -0.121 
 (0.21) (0.40) 
Rest of Europe -0.167 0.013 
 (0.12) (0.35) 
Rest of the World -0.383 0.625 
 (0.24) (0.46) 
Work related -0.129 -0.020 
 (0.13) (0.35) 
Partner or family related -0.165 -0.079 





*p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  























Country of origin Number of migrants from the country Biggest destination 
Number of migrants 
to the biggest 
destination 
    
Albania 212 Greece 185 
Belgia 65 Netherlands 17 
Bulgaria 133 Cyprus 32 
Switzerland 44 France 8 
Cyprus 12 Greece 6 
Czeck Republic 145 Slovakia 82 
Germany 622 Switzerland 219 
Denmark 61 Sweden 22 
Estonia 46 Finland 21 
Spain 105 Switzerland 26 
Finland 131 Sweden 106 
France 347 Switzerland 82 
United Kingdom 573 Ireland 369 
Greece 106 Cyprus 63 
Croatia 140 Slovenia 90 
Hungary 98 Israel 23 
Ireland 58 United Kingdom 44 
Israel 11 Switzerland 4 
Iceland 20 Denmark 8 
Italy 279 Switzerland 93 
Lithuania 109 Ireland 34 
Latvia 85 Ireland 22 
Netherlands 122 Belgium 58 
Norway 51 Sweden 32 
Poland 610 Ireland 190 
Portugal 152 Switzerland 56 
Romania 475 Israel 137 
Russia 1880 Estonia 660 
Sweden 129 Norway 52 
Slovenia 39 Croatia 24 
Slovakia 115 Czeck Republic 83 
Turkey 314 Germany 82 
Ukraine 564 Israel 221 
Kosovo 35 Switzerland 22 




















 Natives Immigrants Descendants 
 b/se b/se b/se 
    
Trust, birth country  0.203***  
  (0.042)  
Trust, parent’s birth country   0.175*** 
   (0.052) 
Age -0.020*** 0.002 -0.047*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.012) 
Age squared/100 0.019*** 0.000 0.051*** 
 (0.002) (0.015) (0.012) 
Female -0.040*** -0.016 0.084 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.079) 
Children home -0.007 -0.171** 0.069 
 (0.015) (0.083) (0.080) 
Now divorced -0.147*** -0.206* -0.066 
 (0.023) (0.102) (0.130) 
Widowed -0.086*** 0.111 -0.100 
 (0.025) (0.179) (0.129) 
Never married 0.059*** -0.095 0.082 
 (0.021) (0.079) (0.118) 
Low income -0.262*** -0.222*** -0.223* 
 (0.018) (0.069) (0.113) 
High income 0.164*** 0.265*** 0.212*** 
 (0.019) (0.093) (0.067) 
Tertiary 0.490*** 0.462*** 0.510*** 
 (0.018) (0.101) (0.070) 
Primary -0.248*** -0.187** -0.437*** 
 (0.016) (0.071) (0.089) 
Paid work last week -0.017 0.096 -0.030 
 (0.017) (0.078) (0.089) 
Unemployed -0.267*** 0.002 -0.166 
 (0.028) (0.105) (0.164) 
Live in a big city 0.055*** -0.029 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.051) (0.082) 
Catholic 0.073*** -0.012 -0.113 
 (0.020) (0.054) (0.129) 
Protestant 0.232*** 0.078 0.148 
 (0.023) (0.099) (0.146) 
Orthodox 0.027 0.168** -0.124 
 (0.032) (0.068) (0.075) 
Islamic 0.053 -0.028 -0.307 
 (0.050) (0.195) (0.223) 
Constant 4.292*** 3.558*** 3.033** 
 (0.096) (0.541) (1.250) 
Residence country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 
data Yes Yes Yes 
N 
R-squared 
132663 7151 4279 
0.184 0.109 0.158 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   









 Natives Immigrants Descendants 
 b/se b/se b/se 
    
Trust, birth country  -0.291**  
  (0.125)  
Trust, parent’s birth country   -0.089 
   (0.165) 
Age -0.112*** -0.156*** -0.096** 
 (0.009) (0.050) (0.044) 
Age squared/100 0.129*** 0.171*** 0.127** 
 (0.010) (0.053) (0.049) 
Female 0.702*** 0.933*** 0.898** 
 (0.054) (0.208) (0.358) 
Children home 0.152** 0.082 0.172 
 (0.064) (0.340) (0.211) 
Now divorced -0.179* -0.307 0.370 
 (0.096) (0.374) (0.447) 
Widowed 0.399*** -0.723 0.723 
 (0.102) (0.627) (0.949) 
Never married 0.025 -0.579 0.271 
 (0.086) (0.368) (0.542) 
Low income 0.049 0.993** 0.011 
 (0.074) (0.394) (0.272) 
High income 0.147* 0.342 -0.131 
 (0.078) (0.270) (0.323) 
Tertiary 0.030 0.267 0.050 
 (0.073) (0.320) (0.407) 
Primary 0.473*** 0.919** 0.370 
 (0.067) (0.441) (0.366) 
Paid work last week -0.011 0.212 0.228 
 (0.069) (0.280) (0.356) 
Unemployed -0.379*** -0.460 -0.592 
 (0.116) (0.618) (0.408) 
Live in a big city -0.182*** 0.343 -0.284 
 (0.058) (0.270) (0.331) 
Catholic 0.135* 0.684 -0.058 
 (0.081) (0.540) (0.278) 
Protestant 0.238** 0.063 -0.275 
 (0.095) (0.514) (0.223) 
Orthodox 0.336** -0.786 1.971*** 
 (0.133) (0.835) (0.387) 
Islamic 3.048*** 1.022* 0.637* 
 (0.206) (0.580) (0.321) 
Constant 5.130*** 12.593*** 7.164*** 
 (0.399) (4.460) (1.477) 
Residence country fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round Yes Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 
data Yes Yes Yes 
N 
R-squared 
132663 7151 4279 
0.015 0.018 0.029 
*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   







 Higher trust in destination 
Lower trust in 
destination 
 b/se b/se 
   
Trust in police, birth country -0.528** -0.026 
 (0.232) (0.801) 
Individual controls  Yes Yes 
Residence country fixed 
effects Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for ESS 
round Yes Yes 
Indicator variables for missing 





*p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010   
Source: European Social Survey 
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